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Lawyers who serve corporate clients recognize that for sheer
shock value the ultimate resolution of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) National Student Marketing Corp. litigation1

may never match the effect achieved by the Commission simply
through filing the complaint. The high drama achieved by the
SEC's action is, of course, attributable to its decision to allege violations of the securities laws 2 on the part of not just the usual coterie of
accountants and insiders, but also by the law firms of W'hite &
Case and Lord, Bissell & Brook and by certain of their lawyers indit A substantial portion of this article deals with securities laws violations
alleged by the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC v. National Student
Marketing Corp., Civ. Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972). The reader
should bear in mind that the SEC's factual allegations and legal theories have not as
yet stood the test of an adversary proceeding on the merits. Nothing said in this
article is meant to suggest that there is truth in the SECs charges of misconduct by
the defendants.
* Member, Ohio Bar. B.B.A., 1967; J.D., 1970, University of Notre
Dame.

This article was written in connection with course work for a graduate securities law seminar which the author attended while a Fellow at the University
of Pennsylvania Law School Center for Study of Financial Institutions. The author is indebted to the Director of the Center, Professor Robert H. Mundheim,
for his invaluable counsel and assistance, and also thanks the practitioners and
students who participated in the seminar for their comments and suggestions.
The views expressed are his own.
1. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civ. Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C.,
filed Feb. 3, 1972). For the text of the complaint, see [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,360, at 91,913 (D.D.C. 1972).
2. In the course of four claims for relief, the SEC asserts violations by various defendants of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1970); section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id.' § 78j(b)
(1970), and rule 10b-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972); and sections 13 and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m and
78n(a), and "rules and regulations thereunder." The substantive allegations that
are material to this article are detailed at pp. 419-21 infra.
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vidually, together with a lawyer who is a sole practitioner.3
Almost as startling as the identity of the cast of defendants is

the measure of relief demanded-entry of injunctions permanently restraining the defendant attorneys from violating the securities laws.4

Besides making any future securities law violation by an enjoined defendant a contempt of court, entry of the relief prayed for would
furnish the Commission with grounds for sanctioning the defendant
attorneys under rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice.'
Among the penalties that could be imposed thereunder is suspension
of the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission.0
The drastic effect of such a sanction on a law firm's corporate practice is easily seen.
This article addresses one of the major issues raised by the SEC

in its charges against the defendant attorneys: the accountability of
3. The defendants: National Student Marketing Corp. (NSMC); Cortes
W. Randell, President, Chief Executive Officer and Director of NSMC; John G.
Davies, Vice President, General Counsel and a Director of NSMC; James F. Joy,
Executive Vice President and a Director of NSMC; Bernard J. Kurek, Controller
of NSMC; Roger 0. Walther, Director and former officer of NSMC; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (PMM); Anthony M. Natelli, partner in charge of PMM's
Washington, D.C., office; Joseph Scansaroli, former PMM accountant and Assistant Controller of NSMC; White & Case; Marion Jay Epley, III, partner of
White & Case; Robert A. Katz, attorney for purchasers of Compujob, Inc., from
NSMC; Cameron Brown, formerly President of Interstate National Corp. (INC),
now President and Chief Executive Officer of NSMC; Paul E. Allison, formerly
Director of INC and of INC's successor which is a wholly owned subsidiary of
NSMC; William J. Bach, same capacities as Allison; Robert P. Tate, formerly
INC's Chairman and a former Director of INC's successor; Lord, Bissell &
Brook; Max E. Meyer, Lord, Bissell partner and former INC board member;
Louis F. Schauer, Lord, Bissell partner.
Summary judgment was entered in favor of Allison, Bach and Tate in SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP.
93,820, at 93,552 (D.D.C. 1973). The basis for the granting of summary judgment with respect to these defendants was that entry of the permanent
injunction requested by the SEC would not further the public interest. Each of
the three had resigned all director or corporate insider positions held and would
not be expected to occupy such positions in the future. See id. at 93,563.
4. The injunctive relief requested has been termed "broad enough to cause
nightmares whenever a professional's opinion is sought," BNA SEC. REG. & L.
REP. No. 138, at A-3 (1972); and it has been noted that requests for injunctive
relief of the type sought by the Commission are usually "reserved for repeated
or notorious violators of the law." Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Law Liabilities,
27 Bus. LAw. 1153, 1155 (1972). For a general discussion of the framework
for equitable actions by the SEC, see Mathews, SEC Civil Injunction Actions I
& 11, 5 REv. SEc. REG. 949, 969 (1972).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1972). For a general discussion of rule 2(e), see
Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules and the Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DuKE L.J. 969.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 202.2(e)(3) (1972).
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a lawyer for his opinion letters. The SEC's allegations and theories
of recovery based upon opinions rendered by the defendant attorneys
are considered in conjunction with a more general analysis of counsel's exposure for his opinion letters at common law and under the securities laws. Following that discussion, attention is given to an annotated set of guidelines drafted to assist lawyers in fulfilling their
legal and professional responsibilities in the rendition of opinion letters. To lend some perspective to those analyses, the initial segment
of the article briefly examines the modem phenomenon of the expanding constitutencies of the business manager and the lawyer who
advises him.
THE LAWYER AND His CORPORATE CLIENT
Just as it is readily apparent that the close working relationship
between the bar and its business clientele has been a vastly useful
and profitable one for both sides, it is clear that there are also dangers inherent in this symbiotic existence. Some of these dangers
were pointed out by a group of able jurists during the 1920's and
1930's. Operating as a sort of "Distant Early Warning System,"
commentators such as Chief Justice William Howard Taft,7 Adolph
A. Berle8 and Chief Justice Harlan Stone? openly wondered whether,
in striving to meet the demands of its corporate clients, a large segment of the bar was not sacrificing some of its own character and
integrity-its soul-not to mention its independence of thought and
action. Chief Justice Stone phrased his views especially forcefully:
Steadily the best skill and capacity of the profession has been drawn
into the exacting and highly specialized service of business and fi-

nance. At its best the changed system has brought to the command
of the business world loyalty and a superb proficiency and technical
skill. At its worst it has made the learned profession of an earlier
day the obsequious servant of business, and tainted it with the morals
and manners of the market place in its most anti-social manifestations.
In any case we must concede that it has given us a Bar. . .whose
energy and .talent for public service and for bringing the law into harmony with changed conditions have been largely absorbed in the advancement of the interests of clients.' 0
The answer to Stone's broadside was delivered by Robert
7. See Taft, Legal Ethics, I BOSTON U.L. REV. 233 (1921).
8. See Berle, The Modern Legal Profession, in IX ENCYLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 340 (1933).
9. See Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1934).
10. Id. at 7.
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Swaine. Writing in 1949,11 Swaine branded Stone's charge that the
profession had become the "obsequious servant of business" as "intemperate and exaggerated,"'1 2 pointing out that the profession "has
conducted itself with standards of morals and manners fully abreast
of the morals and manners of the times; indeed usually ahead of
them."" Swaine nevertheless acknowledged that the closeness of
the relationship between the legal profession and its business clients
had bred some dubious practices. In particular, Swaine questioned
the propriety of allowing an attorney in substance to become his own
client through acting as a client's director or officer, 4 and he observed that
it must be conceded that professional service to a single corporate
client long continued contains a real threat to the lawyer's independence of thought, or at least of expression. .

.

. Loyalty to the cli-

ent is a fundamental tenet of our profession. Where the limits of
such loyalty are to be drawn is often a difficult question. 15
Few would quarrel with Swaine's observations that client loyalty
is a "fundamental tenet of our profession." For the lawyer who
serves business interests, it may be difficult to identify just who the
"client" is, however. Is the client: (1) management; (2) the board
of directors; (3) the shareholders; (4) all of the above; or (5)
none of the above?' This question is not so easily answered by a
11. Swaine, The Impact of Business on the Profession: An Answer to Critics of
the Modern Bar, 35 A.B.A.J. 89 (1949).
12. Id. at 171.
13. Id.
14. id. at 170. Swaine's discomfort concerning the practice was highlighted
by his claim that most corporate lawyers would be "greatly relieved" if lawyers
were barred from serving as directors of their clients by a canon of ethics, Id.
As was pointed out in an article written in 1956 by Martin Mayer, Swaine's "intensely effective answer" to Chief Justice Stone's criticism was remembered well
by the profession, but his call for a canon outlawing acceptance of board positions
with client firms by lawyers was soon forgotten. Mayer, Keepers of the Business
Conscience, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Feb., 1956, at 50, 56. The efficacy of the practice criticized by Mr. Swaine is increasingly being called into question these days.
See EXPANDING REsPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE SECURIEs ACTS TRANSCRIPT 166-68 (S.
Goldberg ed. 1973); PLI, How To Go PUBLIC 310 (1971) (remarks of Prof. Donald
E. Schwartz); Hoffman, Gradationsin Liability, 27 Bus. LAw. 173, 176-77 (Special
Issue Feb., 1972); Lefkowitz, The Attorney-Client Relationship and the Corporation,
14 Co"p. PRAc. COMMENTATOR 21 (1972); Loss, The Opinion, 24 Bus. LAw. 527, 529
(1969). Cf. Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), where it was noted
that
acts [of a lawyer] as a director cannot be separated from his acts as a
member of the firm who were [sic] general counsel for the corporation. The
line between the two is entirely too fine to permit the professional obligation as a lawyer and the fiduciary obligation as a director to be placed
inconvenient separate boxes. Id. at 631.
15. Swaine, supra note 11, at 171.
16. According to the Code of Professional Responsibility, the answer is plain
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lawyer who works on a day-to-day basis with the corporation's executives, sits on the corporation's board, and regularly prepares and
files documents with the SEC for submission to shareholders.
Apart from the always troublesome "who is your client" question, the modem business lawyer, not unlike the corporate manager
he advises, finds his professional environment increasingly complicated by a changing corporate scene. There was not always such
confusion. In the bygone days of the moguls it was clear enough
for the businessman that being a part of the management team
meant serving the interests of the stockholders, and the raison d'6tre
of the corporation's legal counsel was service to management. Those
dark ages never knew appellations such as Ralph Nader; class action; ecology; Title VII; rule 10b-5; Pomerantz, Levy, Haudek &
Block; products liability or BarChris Construction Corporation. In
those times judges did not say things like "a defective security should
be no different from a defective product. Both carry dangerous
consequences for the unsuspecting consumer."' 1 Why, it seems like
only yesterday that a "defective product" was called a "lemon" and
a "consumer" was just someone who used things up.
What has happened is that the times have changed.. Responsibilities that were never recognized previously have now come into
view. The obligations of corporate management no longer can be
viewed as running solely to the entity's ownership interest; instead,
enough: (5) none of the above. Ethical Consideration 5-18 tells us that:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity
owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMIIY AND CANONS OF
JUDICIAL ETMICS, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 5-18, at 20 (1971).
This guidance is rather meaningless in a specific context, a point demonstrated by the conflict arising when a corporation seeks to assert the attorneyclient privilege against its own shareholders. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 280 F.
Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (holding corporation could not assert privilege
against stockholders in suit charging mismanagement), vacated, 430 F.2d 1093
(5th Cir. 1970) (ordering evidentiary hearing as to availability of privilege on
facts presented), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971), on remand, [1972-73 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 93,600 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (rejecting assertion of privilege after hearing). The initial Garner holding was followed in
Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 45 F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Ky. 1968) (where the court noted
that "[a] corporate entity acts only for its stockholders . . . ." Id. at 511).
See also Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537, 547-48 (D.
Nev. 1972) (indicating that "the corporation is the client"); Kaplan, Conflicts of
Interest in Corporate Law Practice, in THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 231, 234-37 (1972).

17. Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D. Ore. 1971)
(The phrases quoted were prefaced by the important words: "For jurisdictional
purposes . . .").
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management finds itself answerable to a host of different groups, including its employees, its customers and the public at large. Coupled with this expansion of management's constituencies is one of
the leading developments of the 1960's-the threat to management of

personal and professional humiliation by reason of individual liability for misdeeds in the conduct of business matters.1 8

These phe-

nomena of an increasingly complex business world have served to
make corporate managers ever more dependent on purveyors of legal advice. Attorneys' views carry more clout than they used to be-

cause clients need attorneys more.

And as attorneys come to be

idealized as the "due diligence men'

19

and the "corporate con-

science,"20

they must expect that the changing times will require of
them a stricter accountability for their actions. 2
Just as is the case with corporate management, these ideas of
increased accountability and broadening responsibilities mean that
the legal profession must now begin to cope with hitherto unrecog18. The impact on corporations of what has been called "the legal explosion"
is discussed in Caruth, The "Legal Explosion" Has Left Business Shell-shocked,
FORTUNE, April, 1973, at 65. The significance of business management's expanding constituencies and increasing vulnerability to charges of misconduct has
received the attention of the bar. E.g., Proceedings, ABA Nat'l Institute, Corporations Under Attack, in 28 Bus. LAw. 1 (Special Issue 1973); Proceedings,
ABA Nat'l Institute, Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities, in
27 Bus. LAw. 1 (Special Issue Feb., 1972).
19. You represent the company. Who represents the outside directors?
There used to be some talk at these panels that the outside directors
should get together and hire a lawyer or financial adviser or somebody
called the "due diligence man." The "due diligence man" would sit with
the company lawyers, exercising due diligence 12 hours a day, looking
over their shoulders, reporting back to his clients. That has not caught
on, because I think everybody feels the "due diligence man" is already
there. He is the company's lawyer. PLI, PROTECrINo THE CoRPoRlATE
OFxican ANY DRETOR FROM LADmrrY 70 (1970) (remarks of Alan
Applebaum).
20. Panel Discussion, The Corporate Conscience and the Corporate Bar, 26
Bus. LAw. 959 (1971) (focusing on the corporate lawyer's conscience). A different use of the phrase appears in the context of boards of directors. Professor
Myles Mace points this out in his sprightly analysis of what directors can doand what they end up doing. M. MACE, DiRaCTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 26-27
(1971). See also Mayer, supra note 14, at 50.
21. In the well-turned phrasing of a recent California Supreme Court opinion,
it was stated:
[Iln our complex and interdependent society, human relations are ever
being further fit into a framework of legal rights and responsibilities,
and, in this process, the role of the lawyer has become increasingly crucial. As more individuals come to depend upon him, his responsibility
must broaden and deepen. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart &
Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 194, 491 P.2d 421, 432-33, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837,
848-49 (1971).
In Neel the court brought the California rule covering the running of the statute
of limitations for lawyers' malpractice in line with the rule applied in cases of
malpractice by other professionals.
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nized duties owed to new constituencies. As the following discussion demonstrates, just as the businessman can no longer escape liability for his defective goods once they are resold by his immediate
vendee, lawyers are similarly encountering an increasing willingness
on the part of courts to impose liability for slipshod legal work in
favor of those persons who could have foreseeably been expected to
be affected directly by or led to rely on the lawyer's toil. In other
words, the requirement of privity in malpractice cases belongs on a
list of endangered species.
The saga of the corporate lawyer's emerging responsibilities is
far from being simply the story of a developing framework of substantive liability, however. There is inherent in the idea of the lawyer's being favored with a monopoly license to practice law the
premise that his performance as a professional will be subjected to
self-regulation by the lawyer himself and to more formal regulation
by the profession as a whole. As we start this survey of the contours of the lawyer's role in preparing legal opinions, it should be
kept in mind that there is a good deal more to our study than mapping out the limits of a lawyer's substantive exposure to legal
sanctions. For one thing, the law of professional malpractice is in
flux, and this situation makes the use of yesterday's guidelines to
chart today's actions dangerous business. Further, the concept of
litigation as a distasteful way to settle disputes is fundamental to our
legal system.22 How much more unpalatable is the use of litigation
to obtain guidelines for professional development?
DEVELOPMENTS IN MALPRACTICE LAW

The Standardof Care
Legal malpractice consists of the failure of an attorney "to use
such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and
capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the
tasks which they undertake. ' 23 When such failure proximately
22. Indeed, the American Bar Association's pamphlet setting forth the Code
of Professional Responsibility pointedly includes the following quotation from

Abraham Lincoln:
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often the
real loser-in fees, expenses and waste of time. As a peacemaker, the
lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man.
CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsmmrry, supra note 16, at 48.
23. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr.
821, 825 (1961). See generally Leavitt, The Attorney as Defendant, 13 HASTINGS
L.. 1, 23-32 (1961); Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND.
L. REV. 755, 762-65 (1959); Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1292,

1294-1302 (1963).
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causes damages, it gives rise to a cause of action in tort. 24 Moreover, since in the usual case the attorney has undertaken to perform
his duties pursuant to a contract with his client, his failure to exercise
the requisite skill and care is also a breach of an express or implied
term of that contract.25 Thus, an instance of legal malpractice will
generally, give rise to both a cause of action in tort and a breach of
contract claim.2 6
Obviously, not every miscue by an attorney will give rise to malpractice liability. As the California Supreme Court pointed out in
27
Lucas v. HamM,
[t]he attorney is not liable for every mistake he may make in his
practice; he is not, in the absence of an express agreement, an insurer of the soundness of his opinions or of the validity of an instrument he is engaged to draft; and he is not liable for being in error as
to a question of law on which reasonable doubt may be entertained
by well-informed lawyers . . . . These principles are equally applicable whether the plaintiff's claim is based on tort or breach of con-

tract.28
The court's sincerity in its proclamation that an attorney is not "an
insurer of his opinions or of the validity of an instrument he is engaged to draft" is established by its refusal to allow recovery from
the defendant attorney for misinterpreting the Rule Against Perpetuities, notwithstanding that the particular blunder committed could
have been avoided had the defendant consulted decisional authority
interpreting the Rule that was on the books at the time the defective
instrument was drafted.2 9 Noting that the Rule had been referred
to as "a dangerous instrumentality in the hands of most members of
the bar," 0 the court felt that the level of skill exercised by the defendant was in line with that generally used by lawyers.
To be distinguished from instances involving negligent malpractice by attorneys are those cases where the attorney's wrongful con24. Cf. Averill, Attorney's Liability to Third Parties for Negligent Malpractice, 2 LAIND & WATER L. REv. 379 (1967).
25. E.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198 (1880); Wilcox v. Executors
of Plummer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172 (1830).
26. E.g., Lucas v. Harem, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589 n.2, 364 P.2d 685, 688 n.2,
15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 n.2 (1961); Wade, supra note 23; Note, supra note 23, at
1292-94.
27. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
28. Id. at 591-92, 364 P.2d at 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 825 (citations omitted).
29. See Note, supra note 23, at 1297.
30. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 592, 364 P.2d 685, 690, 15 Cal. Rptr.
821, 826 (1961), quoting Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67
HAxv. L. REv. 1349 (1954).
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duct involves fraud.

A professional may be held liable for fraud

based on either an intentional misrepresentation or a representation
made where there was no basis for a belief in its accuracy.

New

York's highest court has stated the rule as follows:
A representation certified as true to the knowledge of the accountants when knowledge there is none, a reckless misstatement,
or an opinion based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion there was no genuine belief in its truth, are all sufficient upon
which to base liability [for fraud]. A refusal to see the obvious, a
failure to investigate the doubtful, if sufficiently gross, may furnish
evidence leading to an inference of fraud so as to impose liability
for losses suffered by those who rely on the balance sheet. In
other words, heedlessness and reckless disregard of consequences
may take the place of deliberate intention. 3 '
The Limits of Liability

The significance of the distinction between negligent malpractice
and professional misconduct amounting to fraud is found in the degree of exposure to liability resulting from the wrongdoing. In the

case of fraudulent misrepresentation, a misrepresenter may be held
liable to all persons whom he should reasonably have foreseen would

be injured by his misrepresentation.32 On the other hand, the limits of an attorney's exposure for negligent malpractice are not so

easy to define. Venerable authority demonstrating two conflicting
views is the Supreme Court's 1880 decision in Savings Bank v.
Ward.3 " In that case, the defendant attorney had conducted a

title search and had given his client a certificate stating the legal
opinion that the land was held by the client in fee simple. Relying

on the certificate, the plaintiff bank made a loan to the client secured
31. State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 112, 15 N.E.2d 416, 419
(1938). See also Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D.R.I. 1968)
("[tihe same broad perimeter [applicable to intentional misrepresentation] prevails if the misrepresenter's conduct is heedless enough to permit an inference of
fraud"); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931)
(speaking of the liability of accountants for their audit, Judge Cardozo observed that
"if their audit has been so negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine
belief in its adequacy. . . this . . . is fraud").
32. E.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 205 (1880); Rusch Factors, Inc.
v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D.R.I. 1968). The court in Rusch Factors gave
several reasons in support of a broad right of recovery in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation:
First, liability should extend at least as far in fraud, an intentional tort,
as it does in negligence cases resulting in personal injury or property
damage. Second, the risk of loss for intentional wrongdoing should invariably be placed on the wrongdoer who caused the harm, rather than on
the innocent victim of the harm. Finally, a broad rule of liability may
deter future misconduct. Id. (citation omitted).
33. 100 U.S. 195 (1880).

380

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1973:371

by the realty. When the client defaulted and the deed proved worthless, the bank sued for malpractice.
Reasoning from cases such as Winterbottom v. Wright,4 a sixjustice majority ruled that lack of privity with the defendant attorney
barred the plaintiff from recovery. The contrary view was succinctly stated by Chief Justice Waite on behalf of the minority:
I think if a lawyer, employed to examine and certify to the recorded
title of real property, gives his client a certificate which he knows or
ought to know is to be used by the client in some business transaction
with another person as evidence of the facts certified to, he is liable to
such other person relying on his certificate for any loss resulting from
his failure to find on record a conveyance affecting the title, which,
by the use of ordinary professional care and skill, he might have
found. That, it seems to me, is this case.35
Thus, the Ward case represents a confrontation between the view
that privity is a sine qua non for negligent malpractice recovery and
the position that, where reliance is or should be foreseen, recovery
may be had by one member of a foreseeable class who relies on a
lawyer's judgment.3 0 Although Ward is obviously of importance to
an understanding of the bounds of a lawyer's responsibility for his
legal opinions, it is by no means the only pertinent authority, because, as we shall see, the boundaries of lawyers' opinion letter exposure are to a great extent shaped by developments in professional
malpractice law generally.
Two important decisions by the New York Court of Appeals,
Glanzer v. Shepherd 7 and Ultramares Corp. v. Touche"8 add further definition to the general scope of a professional's liability for
negligence. Glanzer involved a suit by a third party against a
public weigher who had negligently overweighed a load of beans,
causing the plaintiff to pay for more beans that were received.
The defendant's client had requested that the defendant furnish the
plaintiff with a return of the weight, so reliance by the plaintiff on
the defendant's work was clearly foreseeable. On these facts, Judge
Cardozo had no difficulty allowing recovery by the plaintiff. Lack
34. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
35. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 207 (1880).
36. While the identity of the plaintiff in Ward was not foreseen by defendant
attorney, reliance on the certificate of title was clearly a foreseeable act since
such certificates are commonly used as a basis for making loans. See Annot.,
Attorney's Liability, to One Other than His Immediate Client, For Consequences
of Negligence in Carrying Out Legal Duties, 45 A.L.R.3d 1181, 1200 (1972).
37. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
38. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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of privity was no barrier, the court held, since "[gliven the contract

and the relation the duty is imposed by law."39
In contrast with Glanzer, Ultramaresinvolved an action brought

against an accounting firm by a creditor whose reliance on financial
statements was found to be unforeseen in fact, though reliance by

some creditor was or should have been foreseen since the accountants knew that their client's operation required large amounts of
credit and that the certified financial statements would be circulated
to creditors. The defendant in Ultramareswas alleged to have certified wrongfully that a balance sheet accurately reflected a one mil-

lion dollar net worth when the audited company was insolvent. The
plaintiff alleged that in reliance on the bogus balance sheet he had

loaned money to the insolvent company. Since the defendant's negligence was clear, the only question for the court was whether the dedefendant had breached a duty owed to the plaintiff. Again writing
for the majority, Judge Cardozo this time refused to find the requisite
duty. Glanzer was held to be inapposite because there the service
rendered was primarily for the information of the identified third
party and only incidentally for the formal promisee. The defendant
in Ultramdres, on the other hand, was said to have certified the fi-

nancials primarily for the benefit of its client and only incidentally
or collaterally for the use of those individuals to whom the statements
might be exhibited.40
The motivating force behind the court's decision to deny liability

appears to spring from the same sentiment that underlies modem
holdings which refuse to sanction use of the class action where to do
so would result in massive liability. Just as such recent cases have
decried the possibility of "horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment,"4 Ultramares discloses an expression of the fear that to in39. 233 N.Y. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276 (citation omitted).
40. 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
41. E.g., Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D. Wis.
1972); Rogers v. Cobur Fin. Corp., 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Ratner v.
Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). These cases
were brought under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970).
Section 130(a), id. § 1640(a), provides for a minimum recovery of $100 by any
person aggrieved by a violation of the exceedingly technical act. For another
example of a court bending under the influence of public policy considerations
and refusing to expand the parameters of liability to the fullest extent imaginable,
see Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 259 N.E.2d 720
(1970). The defendant in Hall had used less than 8 point type in its sales contracts in violation of section 402 of the New York Retail Installment Sales Act,
N.Y. Pots. Paop. L.w c. 41, § 402 (McKinney 1962). In cases of violation, the
Installment Sales Act provided for recovery of the finance charges imposed, and
plaintiff sought recovery for herself and a class of all persons having contracts
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pose liability in favor of the plaintiff creditor would lead to a rule
exposing professionals to liability for negligence "in an indetermi-

nate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." '42
This essential policy commitment to protection of professionals from
widespread liability for careless error did not, in the court's mind at
least, conflict with the policy of giving recognition to the reasonable
expectations of a party not in privity, since the court doubted whether
"the average businessman receiving a certificate without paying for
it, and receiving it merely as one of a multitude of possible investors,"
would expect to recover from the certifying accountant for an "honest
blunder."4

At a time when Dean Prosser's citadel of privity has been pretty
much reduced to rubble and when courts are increasingly unwilling
to bar recovery in products liability cases on the ground that the
damage done was economic harm rather than personal injury, 4 there
is strong reason to doubt whether courts will be content either to
using similar type size. The court refused to allow recovery on behalf of the class,
saying that "Etihe public value" of class action relief was "open to substantial
doubt" since the suit did not address "the real evil of retail credit buying," which
was identified as "the heavy cost of credit to consumers." Hall v. Coburn Corp.,
26 N.Y.2d at 403, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 285, 259 N.E.2d at 723. Though the Hall
case has been criticized as "outrageous procedural law," the result achieved is
hardly shocking in light of such decisions as Ratner, Rogers and Kriger. See
Dole, Private Enforcement of Consumer Credit Legislation, 26 Bus. LAw. 915,
923 (1971).
In a similar vein one may wonder whether it can be said that recovery by a
person injured by management malfeasance, in a suit against accountants who fail
to uncover the malfeasance, really addresses itself to the aim of preventing or
minimizing instances of mismanagement. It would seem germane for a court
called upon to rule in an Ultramares-type setting to consider whether an extra
measure of diligence could be wrung out of the defendant professional by a liability decree, and if so, whether this benefit might not be outweighed by inhibitions on the profession's ability to function in a climate where the threat of
devastating punishment for honest blunders would attend everyday actions.
42. 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. One major difference between the
class action cases such as Ratner, Rogers, Kriger and Hall and the factual setting
of Ultramares deserves mention. In the class actions, the damages that would
have been imposed pursuant to applicable statutory provisions (such as the $100
minimum under the Truth in Lending Act), would not necessarily have borne any
relation to actual economic harm. This would not be the case in a malpractice
suit.
43. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
44. The leading case allowing recovery for economic harm under a strict liability theory is Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965). For a discussion of the issues involved and additional cases on point, see
Annot., Privity of Contract as Essential in Actions Against Remote Manufacturer
or Distributor for Defects in Goods Not Causing Injury to Person or to Other
Property, 16 A.L.R.3d 683 (1967).
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follow Ultramares on its facts or to honor Judge Cardozo's dicta
that the right to recovery for negligent malpractice "is one that is
bounded by the contract."4 5 Presaging a break with the traditional

pro-privity view is the tentative draft of section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.4" Under the terms of the section, liability for

negligent malpractice may be imposed on a defendant in favor of a
reliant party not in privity whether or not the defendant knew of the
injured party's identity at the time of the negligent act; 47 it is sufficient

that the plaintiff be a person or a member of a class of persons for
whose benefit or guidance the defendant intended to supply informa45. 255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448. Despite this language it is, of course,
still possible to use Glanzer to support a judgment of liability in the face of a
lack of privity where the plaintiff's reliance was actually foreseen at the time the
malpractice was committed. E.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85
(D.R.I. 1968); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969). Nevertheless, some
courts have chosen to read Ultramares as limiting recovery for negligent malpractice to those bound by the contract. E.g., Stephens Indus. Inc. v. Haskins & Sells,
438 F.2d 357, 359 (10th Cir. 1971); State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104,
15 N.E.2d 416 (1938); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup.
Ct. 1954). In both State Street Trust Co. and Duro the identity of the reliant
party was known beforehand by defendant accountant. The Duro case is criticized in Bradley, Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Audit, 1966 J. Bus.
LAW 190, 193.
46. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 522 (Tent. Draft No. 12 1966). The
section reads as follows:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession, or employment
b I . supplies false information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused
to them by their justifiable reliance upon such information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information, or knows
that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends the
information to influence, or knows that the recipient so intends, or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for
whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in
which it is intended to protect them.
47. In other words, it is not required that the person who is to become the
plaintiff be identified or known to the defendant as an individual when
the information is supplied. It is enough that the maker of the representation intends it to reach and influence either a particular person or
persons, known to him, or a group or class of persons, distinct from the
much larger class who might reasonably be expected sooner or later to
have access to the information, and foreseeably to take some action in
reliance upon it. It is enough, likewise, that the maker of the representation knows that the recipient intends to transmit the information to a
similar person, persons, or group. It is sufficient, in other words, that
the maker knows that the information is intended for repetition to a certain group or class of persons, and that the plaintiff proves to be one
of them, even though the maker never had heard of him when the information was given. Id., comment h, at 23.
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tion, or to whom the defendant knew the information would be supplied.48
In repudiating Ultramares, the Restatement essentially elevates
to majority status the dissent of Chief Justice Waite in Ward nearly
a century ago.49 The only difference between the two views is that
the Restatement frames the scope of the duty owed in terms of the
actual perception of potentially reliant parties by the actor. On the
other hand, the Ward dissent's formulation goes further and reaches
"should have known" cases. The dissent would allow establishment
of the requisite duty owed by reason of inferred knowledge of intended reliance based on custom and usage-such as reliance on
opinions as to the state of title by lenders. Whether this distinction
has any real significance is open to serious question, since in either
case the expectation of the reliant third party in a quality work product would be the same, and it is mainly in terms of giving effect to the
reasonable expectations of the reliant third party that any sense can
be made of extending the professional's malpractice exposure beyond the bounds of privity.50
Section 552's potential for being read to signal the demise of
Ultramares has not been ignored by the courts. In Rusch Factors,
48. A hypothetical situation based on one of a series used by the section's
draftsmen illustrates their intention to part with Ultramares and its progeny. A is
negotiating with a Bank for a credit of $50,000. The Bank requires an audit by
certified public accountants. A employs B & Company, a firm of accountants, to
make the audit, telling them he is going to negotiate a bank loan. A does not get
his loan from the first bank but does negotiate a loan with another bank, which relies
upon B & Company's certified statements. The audit carelessly overstates the financial
resources of A, and in consequence the second bank suffers pecuniary loss. B &
Company is subject to liability to the second bank. Id,, illustration 4, at 24.
49. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
50. This analysis is not meant to give the Restatement a broader reading
than it deserves, however. Another illustration used by the draftsmen demonstrates their intention that the scope of malpractice exposure of accountants should
not extend to every instance where a plaintiff could allege reliance on certified financials. RFSTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, supra note 46, § 552, illustration 7,
at 25. The only point made here is that in the case of an opinion given for a
well-recognized purpose that customarily involves reliance by third parties, such as
a certificate of title, there does not seem to be anything extreme in upholding a
right to recovery on behalf of an injured reliant party. As the discussion below
of different types of legal opinions indicates, there is much room for this middle
ground between the Restatement's individual, who is a reliant member of an actually foreseen class, and Judge Cardozo's member of the "indeterminate class" of
all persons who might foreseeably rely on an opinion.
It should be noted that there are other justifications for allowing recovery
from professionals in addition to the interest in insuring that a reliant third party
recoups his losses. See note 52 infra and text accompanying note 58 infra.
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Inc. v. Levin 5' the provision was cited favorably by the district court
en route to its holding that a finance company had stated a good
cause of action against an accountant who was alleged to have negligently certified financial statements relied on by the plaintiff. While
the facts in question revealed that reliance by the plaintiff had been
clearly foreseen by the defendant accountant, making the situation
more analogous to Glanzer than Ultramares, the court nevertheless
2
took the occasion to denounce Ultramares in no uncertain terms.5
The court further ruled that the plaintiff had stated a good cause of
action in fraud, noting that privity was no barrier in such cases and
that proof of gross negligence could suffice for recovery.5 3
The reasoning of the court in Rusch Factorswith respect to the
demise of privity as a prerequisite for recovery found favor with
Iowa's Supreme Court in Ryan v. Kanne.54 Like the court in Rusch
Factors, the Iowa court castigated Ultramares as "an unwarranted
inroad upon the principle that the risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed."3 5 Needless to say, the court in
Ryan, like the court in Rusch Factors, had no difficulty permitting
recovery in favor of a party who was actually foreseen by the defendant accountant at the time the financial statements in question were
prepared.
Adding to the significance of the sentiments expressed in section 552, Rusch Factors, and Ryan is the apparent willingness of
California's Supreme Court to depart from precedent extending all
the way back to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Ward. Thus in Biakanja v. Irving,5 6 the court rejected prior precedent57 and allowed a beneficiary of an invalid will to recover from
the individual who negligently failed to have it attested properly. The
following analysis was offered to assist courts called on in the future
51. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
52. The wisdom of the decision in Ultramareshad been doubted . . .and
this Court shares the doubt. Why should an innocent reliant party be
forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread
by imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of
insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the cost
onto the entire consuming public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the cautionary techniques of the accounting profession? For
these reasons it appears to this Court that the decision in Ultramares
constitutes an unwarranted inroad upon the principle that "[t]he risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed." Id. at 90-91.
53. Id. at 90.
54. 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
55. Id. at 401.
56. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
57. Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895).
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to determine the rights of third parties allegedly injured by negligent
malpractice:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will
be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and
involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent
to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the fore-

seeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to
8
the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.
The California court's rejection of a set test to measure exposure
in malpractice cases leaves needed room for recognition of the widely
varying circumstances in which professionals act and render their
opinions. While this flexibility is of limited significance in the case
of audit certificates in view of their essentially homogeneous nature,
legal opinions are issued in widely varying contexts requiring individual analysis of the type called for in Biakana. 9
In concluding this brief outline of professional malpractice, one
might well note again that the times have changed. Courts are a
good deal more venturesome in this area than they once were. The
core of the Supreme Court's pro-privity reasoning in Ward was expressed in its claim that "[t]he only safe rule is to confine the right to
recover to those who enter into the contract; if we go one step beypnd that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty." 0 In
sharp contrast with this stance is the considerably more aggressive
attitude adopted by the California Supreme Court in a recent decision that brings the statute of limitations period for malpractice by
lawyers in line with that for malpractice by other professionals. In
that case the court emphasized that "[t]he legal calling can ill afford
the preservation of a privileged protection against responsibility. '
While the requirement of privity in malpractice cases is still adhered
to in many states, California is not one of them, and given the Cal2
ifornia Supreme Court's impressive credentials as a trend-setter,
58. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).
59. For discussion of some differing contexts in which legal opinions are
issued, see pp. 387-96 infra.
60. 100 U.S. at 203 (1880).
61. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 194, 491
P.2d 421, 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 849 (1971).
62. Consider, for example, the very warm reception given the California
Supreme Court's landmark collateral estoppel decision of Bernhard v. Bank of
Am. Natl Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). See, e.g.,
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 323-24,
326-27, 349 (1971); Goolsby v. Derby, 189 N.W.2d 909 (Iowa 1971); Pennington
v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370 (Alaska 1970); Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Ore. 1, 474 P.2d
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the handful of courts that have already joined California in discarding the need for privity may expect a good deal of company as time
goes on.6 3 This likely development has a number of implications
regarding the exposure of lawyers for negligence in rendering opinion letters, and those implications are discussed in the next section.
IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT OPINION LETTER SETTINGS

In these days of the ubiquitous opinion poll, it is not surprising
that one pollster claims to have made a survey of lawyers' perceptions
of their exposure to liability for the quality of their legal opinions.
329 (1970); Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25
(1965); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. Rlv. 281 (1957). There is a clear analogy that may be drawn
between the California court's rejection of the mutuality doctrine in collateral estoppel cases and its refusal to adhere to the strict need for privity espoused by
Ward. The mutuality rule has been attacked "as destitute of any semblance of
reason, and as 'a maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from
the gaming-table to the bench' . . . ." Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944,
954 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964), quoting 3 J. BENThAM, RATION-

ALE OF JusucAL EvmENcE 579 (1827). There appears to be little to choose from
between the lack of logic criticized by Bentham and the hollow argument advanced by the Supreme Court in Ward that the "only safe rule" is to bar recovery
by those not in privity, because "if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty." 100 U.S. at 203.
63. In addition to Rusch Factors and Ryan v. Kanne, several cases evidence
a willingness to abandon Ward where the alleged wrongdoer actually knew of the
third party's intended reliance or appreciated that the intent of the transaction
was to benefit the third party. See Robinson v. Colebrook Guar. Say. Bank, 109
N.H. 382, 254 A.2d 837 (1969) (holding that third party stated a good cause of
action on allegation of negligence against bank where phrase "payable on death to
X" used for savings account was legally insufficient); Howarth v. Pfeiffer, 443
P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968) (plaintiff was allowed to recover from defendant insurer who
told plaintiff that property was insured by X, causing plaintiff to cancel his insurance); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App. 1971)
(accountants held liable for preparation of financial statements they knew would
be relied upon by plaintiff in extending loan to their client). But see Stephens
Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (refusing to find that
Colorado courts would allow recovery from negligent accountants by third party).
The movement toward the abandonment of privity recently received a significant nudge in the form of an American Law Reports annotation arguing that "the
strict privity doctrine, with its potential for unrecompensable injury to innocent
parties . . . [does not present] a workable solution to the question of an attorney's liability to third parties." Annot., supra note 36, at 1185 (1972). The
Annotation advocates an eclectic approach similar to that advanced by the California Supreme Court in Biakanja. It is also worthy of note that England's highest court appears to have adopted the view that professionals may be held liable
for negligence without regard to privity. See Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller &
Partners, Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465 (1963).
The Hedley Byrne case essentially
adopts the "knew or should have known" approach advocated in the Ward dissent.
See Accountants' Liability to Third Parties-The Hedley Byrne Decision, 120 J.
AcCOUNTANCY, Oct., 1965, at 66-67.
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The survey, undefined as to scope and bearing no claim of statistical
accuracy, is said to have yielded the conclusion that lawyers do not

expect to be held answerable for their written opinions. 4 While the
cases discussed in the preceding section seem to indicate that a
change in such an outlook may be merited, it is recognized that
cases such as Rusch Factors and Ryan v. Kanne deal only with accountants, and thus there is room for the argument that their teach-

ings have no applications to lawyers in light of the different roles
played by the two professions in our society. Proponents of the
view that the two professions are worlds apart in terms of public accountability may draw support from dicta in the SEC's decision in
American Finance Co.6 5 In that ruling the SEC determined that an

accountant who also served as a lawyer for a registrant was not "independent" under the SEC's Accounting Rules. 66

The pertinent

language in the Commission's decision reads as follows:
Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in acting as
the client's advisor, defender, advocate and confidant enters into a
personal relationship in which his principal concern is with the interests and rights of his client. The requirement of the Act of certification by an independent accountant, on the other hand, is intended to
secure for the benefit of public investors the detached objectivity of a
67
disinterested person.
64. Corso, Opinions of Counsel: Responsibilities and Liabilities, 17 CLEV.-MAR.
L. Rrv. 375 (1968).
65. 40 S.E.C. 1043 (1962).
66. The Commission's rule as to the independence of accountants is set forth
in 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b) (1972). See also SEC Accounting Series Release No. 126
(July 5, 1972) (setting forth guidelines and examples of situations involving independence of accountants).
67. American Fin. Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043, 1049 (1962). To the same effect are
the following remarks made by Milton V. Freeman at the American Bar Association's National Institute on the BarChriscase:
Now, you ask why is it, if there is a development of the law in the
direction of liability on accountants, that there should not be liability
upon lawyers equally?
The answer is, I think, in the nature of the representation that is
made by each.
I have here the language of the American Institute of Accountants
which says: "I am objective and impartial. I am as mindful of the interests of strangers who may rely on my opinion as on my clients' interests."
I know no lawyer would ever say that. A lawyer says, "I am a
partisan. I have been retained by my clients. I owe him my full loyalty
and responsibility. I want everybody to know that those are the rules of
my profession."
The accountant makes an entirely different kind of representation
and there are indeed signs that the law is moving in the direction of
holding accountants liable to somebody other than his client.
The law, so far, is very clear. The lawyers' responsibility is exclusively to their own client. Proceedings, ABA Nat'l Institute, The
BarChris Case: Prospectus Liability, 24 Bus. LAw. 523, 639 (1969).
See also Karmel, supra note 4, at 1162-64.
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The principal shortcoming of any abstract argument designed
to distinguish the public responsibilities of lawyers from those of accountants is, of course, that stereotypes are useless in deciding concrete cases-accountants do not always function as relentless bloodhounds and lawyers do not in every circumstance serve as kindly
father-confessors. An argument built around emphasis on a lawyer's "traditional role" fails to account for cases where there is virtually no distinction between the action taken by a lawyer and the
service rendered by an accountant. And it is in the rendition of
formal opinions that the services performed by the two professions
shade together and become indistinguishable. In this area, to hold
accountants responsible for their opinions and, at the same time, to
permit lawyers to escape liability would indeed vest the legal calling
with a "privileged protection against responsibility."'6 8
MunicipalBond Opinions
While the essential similarity of the lawyer's opinion and the
accountant's audit certificate has not escaped the notice of the courts
or the commentators, 69 this likeness does not mean that the two
types of professional opinions must perforce be taken to be identical
in nature and consequence. The inappropriateness of trying to compare a certain type of legal opinion to the auditor's certificate without regard to the setting in which the legal opinion is rendered is
strikingly illustrated by a false step taken by Judge Cardozo in his
Ultramares opinion. In the course of his discussion of the policy
reasons for limiting the exposure of accountants to the parameters
of privity, Judge Cardozo said that the expansion of liability for
negligence to accountants would likewise encompass the conduct of
"many callings other than an auditor's," including "[llawyers who
certify their opinion as to the validity of municipal or corporate
bonds with knowledge that the opinion will be brought to the
notice of the public. ' 70 Given the validity of the court's doubt in
Ultramares that the "average businessman" who had invested in a
company would expect to recover from a company's accountants for
their negligence in auditing the company's books, 71 the accountant/
68. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
69. See SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
Danser, 26 F.R.D. 580, 587 (D. Mass. 1959), aff'd, 281 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1960);
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 188, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931); Note,
Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 No'm DAME
LAV. 588, 607 (1972).
70. 255 N.Y. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448 (1931).
71. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
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bond counsel analogy is infirm since an investor purchasing a bond
for which a legal opinion had been issued has a very legitimate basis
for the opposite expectation. As one practitioner has pointed out,
[t]hose of you who have ever fooled around in the field of municipal
bonds would not be so surprised at the notion of a lawyer's opinion
running to the public. I will never forget my utter horror when I
found that an opinion given on a security by bond counsel not only is
relied upon by the public and the purchasers, but is stapled to the security and later printed on the back of the security, as indeed it still is
today. . . . The bond counsel firm is chosen because its reputation
in the field is such that purchasers will buy the security relying on the
opinion of the firm and that opinion, thereafter, accompanies the se2
curity through its life3
Just as Judge Cardozo's municipal bond opinion/auditor's certificate analogy is questionable from the standpoint of third parties'
reasonable expectations, so also is there reason to question whether
the same policy considerations that attend the issuance of audit certificates likewise apply in the case of municipal bond opinions. In
the audit certificate situation, the Ultramares court apparently determined that the public's interest in the effective functioning of business affairs was best served by allowing accountants to act as independent historians and report on business performance free from
the threat of broad liability for honest errors. One may wonder
whether a similar interest is served by allowing a law firm to make
the representations and foster the reliance that exists in the bond
area free from the threat of liability to those persons who justifiably
rely on the firm's opinion. Such an exemption from liability is particularly questionable where the firm allows its good name to be
used to enhance the value of the security to which the opinion is
attached.
Because of the arguably different expectations on the part of
investors and in light of seemingly different policy considerations that
arise with respect to bond opinions and audit certificates, it is certainly possible that a court committed to Ultramares on the issue of
auditors' liability might, choose not to shield similarly bond counsel
from liability for a negligently rendered opinion. This same type of
reasoning may come into play in the context of opinions issued in
connection with public offerings.
72. Panel Discussion, supra note 20, at 961 (remarks of Frederic L. Ballard).
Accord, TRANscgnnr, supra note 14, at 169 (remarks of A.A. Sommer); cf. id.
at 73-74 (discussing the implications of disclosure that a law firm serves as general counsel).
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Public Offering Opinions
A similar situation involving the use of counsel's name in an
attempt to enhance the value of a security arises in the public offer-

ig area. Of the two sorts of opinions rendered in connection with a
public offering, the first type sets forth a lawyer's judgment on spe-

cific legal matters that are of importance to the offering. These
matters may include due incorporation of the issuer, proper issuance
of the securities, and tax consequences.

Opinions of this sort are

disclosed in the registration statement and counsel recognize that
they are prepared and disclosed "for the benefit . . . of all pur-

chasers of the stock. 73a In addition to the possibility of common
law liability for an error in the rendition of this first type of opinion,
there is the threat that counsel may be held liable as an expert under

section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) 74 to purchasers
of the issue.

In brief, section 11 gives a right of civil recovery to persons
who purchase securities issued in conjunction with a materially mis-

leading registration statement75 filed pursuant to section 5 of the
1933 Act. 76 Lack of privity is no barrier to suit, 77 and proof of reliance on the misrepresentation is not strictly required.78 . Thus, the

effect of section 1l's intricate civil recovery scheme is to undercut
Ultramares with respect to accountants and other persons "whose

profession gives authority" to their work and who consent to being
73. Officers' and Directors' Institute, supra note 18, at 135 (remarks of Robert A. McDowell).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
75. For standing to sue to exist, the shares held by the plaintiff must have
been issued pursuant to the registration statement in question and not some other
registration statement. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 257 F. Supp.
875 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (defendant's motion for summary judgment granted because
plaintiff had not purchased shares issued pursuant to the allegedly misleading registration statement).
76. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1970).
77. See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.. 227, 249
(1933) (calling, the dispensation with the need for privity "the most striking innovation" of the section).
78. If the plaintiff acquires the security after the issuer has made generally
available to its securities holders an earnings statement covering at least a twelve
month period subsequent to the registration statement's effective date, then the
right to recovery is conditioned on the plaintiffs proof that the security was
acquired in reliance on the alleged misrepresentation. However, proof of the
requisite reliance may be made without a showing that plaintiff read the registration statement. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970). In
the absence of this special situation a claimant must only avoid the defense that he
knew of the claimed defect in the registration statement at the time he bought the
security. Id.
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named as "experts" in the registration statements, 79 and to impose

broad liability for negligent misrepresentations made by such professionals. Liability may be avoided only by a showing of exercise
of due diligence under the circumstances.80

In the leading case of Escoti v. BarChris Construction Corp.,81
the federal district court held that, while the defendant accounting
firm was liable under section 11 for negligence in the conduct of its

review of the issuer's financial position, the defendant attorney who
served as a director of the issuer and who prepared the registration

statement was not liable as an expert for material misstatements arising from his negligence in putting the registration statement together, since the section does not contemplate expert liability for
lawyers who supervise registration statement filings.82 The defendant attorney was, however, held liable to plaintiffs under section 11

in his capacity as director. Though the BarChris holding provides
protection from liability for counsel who generally supervise preparation of the registration statement, the case clearly does not protect
attorneys in the instances already referred to where counsel is named
79. Seeid.§ 77k(a)(4).
80. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B)
(1970).
81. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For the definitive treatment of the
case, see Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris
Case, 55 VA. L. Rav. 1, 199 (1969). Commentaries on the case are collected and
discussed in Keefe, Boils and Bubble, Bowling BarChris, 56 A.B.A.J. 92 (1970).
82. The sound basis for the court's failure to subject the lawyer to an expert's liability was explained by Professor Donald Schwartz:
One of the outside directors, I think this is most interesting for us,
was the attorney who actually prepared the registration statement. The
first thing the other defendants said was, "Your honor, I intend to come
clean and tell the truth; he did it." Their defense was that he had overall
responsibility for preparing the registration statement and, therefore,
was an expert within the meaning of the 1933 Act. The significance of
that is that section 11 "contains a provision to the effect that if a portion of
a prospectus has been prepared by an expert, the non-experts can rely on
him unless they have good reason for thinking he has not done the job
properly, or that there is some inaccuracy." They said, "We relied on
this expert. Therefore he is liable for everything and we are liable for
nothing."
Judge McLean rejected this contention; he found the lawyer is not
an expert, at least with regard to the entire registration statement.
There may be matters where the lawyer is an expert. For example, if
there is a tax opinion expressed. I think others can safely rely on that
without fear of liability on their own part. The expert takes responsibility
for that particular type of assertion.
The concept of expertise cannot apply to the whole registration
statement, or everybody would let someone else bear the brunt for him,
which would flout the scheme that Congress had in mind. How TO Go
PUBLIC, supra note 14, at 304-06.
For further views on the scope of an attorney's liability as an expert under
section 11, see BarChris Institute, supra note 67, at 555-56, 591, 676 (remarks
of Arnold Daum, Jack M. Whitney H, and Milton V. Freeman, respectively).
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in the registration statement in connection with opinions rendered
on such technical matters as tax consequences br the validity of the

securities issued. 3

This type of "expert" opinion can give rise to

section 11 liability.

In contrast with expert opinions is the opinion rendered by
counsel in connection with a public offering which states that the
registration statement has been reviewed in an agreed-upon manner8 4 and that counsel has no reason to believe that the registration
statement is misleading in any material respect. Although Bar-

Chris indicates that there is no section 11 liability for such opinions,
there is still the question of counsel's exposure for common law malpractice as a result of his lack of diligence in the rendition of this
type of opinion where counsel is listed in the prospectus as having
"passed on" the registration statement for the company. While it

has been argued that no liability should attach even where counsel
is listed in the prospectus because investors do not rely on counsels

identity in making their investment decisions, 85 it has also been
pointed out that, as in the municipal bond case, counsel are listed
in the prospectus "on the theory that their names and standing have

some impact on the judgment of investors as to whether or not to
purchase the security.

80

Given this clear attempt to engender reli-

ance on counsel by investors, it would seem that the existence or
nonexistence of reliance by a third party is a factual matter best left
for resolution upon consideration of individual parties' claims, and
not a matter which should be resolved by a blanket finding of nonreliance or absence of duty.
Title Opinions
In addition to the municipal bond and public offering cases,
there are other common legal opinion settings that could give rise to
liability to third parties for negligent malpractice should a court elect
83. See BarChris Institute, supra note 67, at 555-56, 591, 676 (remarks of
Arnold Daum, Jack M. Whitney II, and Milton V. Freeman, respectively).
84. For a statement on the need to reach clear agreement on the scope of
counsel's responsibilities at the outset, see id. at 654 (remarks of David S. Henkel).
85. Address by Francis M. Wheat, the Fourth Annual Institute on Securities
Regulation, New York City, Nov. 3, 1972.
86. WBEN CORPORATIONS Go PuBLIC 251 (C. Israels & G. Duff ed. 1970).
See also TRANScRIPT, supra note 14, at 139, 144. It should be noted that the argument has been made that remedial claims by an injured shareholder may include
allegations under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, as well as section 11 and common law charges. See id. at 148-59. Opinion letter claims under securities laws
civil liability provisions other than section 11 are discussed in the context of opinions freeing unregistered stock for sale at pp. 395-411 infra.
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to step beyond the privity barricade. A prime example is the opinion on the state of title similar to the one issued in the Ward case.8"
Given the common expectation of lawyers that opinions concerning
the state of title property will be relied upon by third parties, 88 a
future court may well decide to adopt the view advocated by
the dissent in Ward and allow recovery for negligent malpractice by a reliant lender or purchaser whose precise identity was
unforeseen at the time the opinion was rendered. Because of the
custom and usage surrounding the rendition of a title opinion, a court
could well justify a holding of liability even where the lawyer was
not told the exact purpose to which the opinion would be put; it
would suffice for the plaintiff to belong to a class known to rely
customarily on such opinions.
Audit Letters

In connection with the audit of a public company, accountants
often seek lawyers' opinions directed toward issues requiring special
legal expertise such as the company's freedom from material contingent liabilities (as, for example, where title to a significant amount
of real estate held by a company is in doubt)8 9 and the materiality
of pending litigation. What is the scope of the attorney's liability
to third parties where the erroneous conclusion of a negligently rendered opinion to the accountant is eventually reflected in the company's certified financial statements? A court willing to make the
same sort of public policy judgment arrived at in Ultramares logically would decide not to hold the lawyer liable for simple negligence
in assessing the status of the company's contingent liabilities where
it would not by parity in reasoning hold the accountant liable for
negligence in assessing the status of the company's current or longterm liabilities. By the same token, if a court were to reject Ultramares and impose liability on the accountant for negligence, it
should have little difficulty holding the negligent attorney similarly
liable. 90
87. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
88. Annot., supra note 36, at 1200.
89. A recent and increasing tendency for law firms to adopt a policy of refusing to express opinions on their client's contingent liabilities has been observed. The reason, of course, is the fear of turning a contingent liability into an
existing one by calling a problem to the attention of plaintiffs' lavyers. Address
by Francis M. Wheat, supra note 85.
90. Apart from negligence liability, an attorney's judgment set forth in an
audit letter that is later reflected in the company's certified financial statements
used in a prospectus will afford a basis for liability on the part of the lawyer under section 11, provided he consents to having his name connected with the rep-
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Opinions on the Sale of UnregisteredStock

The final type of legal opinion that is taken up in this analysis
of different opinion letter settings concerns the use of opinions to
facilitate the sale of unregistered stock.

Primary emphasis in the

following discussion is on sketching a number of the considerations
that may come into play in assessing counsel's potential exposure for

a faulty stock sale opinion.
The statutory context. Section 5 of the 1933 Act9 1 broadly prohibits the use of the mail or facilities of interstate commerce to sell a

security unless a registration statement filed with the SEC is in effect, and any person claiming the benefit of an exemption to the fil-

ing requirement has the burden of proving his right to it.92

Be-

cause of the highly technical nature of the Act, persons faced with
the threat of potential liability in connection with the sale of unregistered stock have generally adopted the practice of requiring those in-

volved in such stock transfers to present opinions of counsel stating
that the shares may be sold without registration.
Thus, where a shareholder desires to sell unregistered stock,

the issuing corporation may demand an opinion by or acceptable to
its counsel to the effect that the exemption relied on in issuing the
shares without registration will not be lost by reason of the sale.9 3
In another case, a person who wishes to dispose of shares taken in a
private placement may require his transferee to present an opinion
of counsel to the effect that the transferee is not intent on engaging

in an illegal distribution of the stock, since this could result in both
resentation in the registration statement. See notes 74-83 supra and accompanying text. Cohen & Wheat, Professional Responsibility, reprinted in PLI, FoURTH
ANNuAL INsTrrTuON Sncunrrms REGULATION 75, 81 (1972). For a more detailed discussion of audit letters, see Deer, Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, 28 Bus. LAw. 947 (1973).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
92. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Edwards v.
United States, 312 U.S. 473 (1941); SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.
1959); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
93. An opinion of this sort is involved in the National Student Marketing
litigation. As discussed at pp. 421, 426-29 infra, the law firm of Lord, Bissell & Brook
issued an opinion letter to National Student Marketing Corp., stating that certain
insiders of Interstate National Corp. could sell without a registration statement
shares of NSMC which they acquired by merger. The exemption relied on was
that set forth in rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1972), which provides generally
that the registration provisions of section 5 are not applicable to securities issued in
certain business combinations of a type specified in the rule. Further, the rule
permits certain limited resales of those securities. Other than registration, rule
133 provides no exceptions or exemptions from any other provisions of the federal
securities laws, including the antifraud provisions.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

['Vol. 1973:371

sellers being held in violation of the Act as "statutory underwriters."94 Broker-dealers similarly use legal opinions for protection
from charges that they acted in the capacity of statutory underwriters
in connection with the distribution to the public of substantial blocks
of unregistered stock. 95
Securities laws exposure. From the earlier discussion of a lawyer's common law malpractice exposure for his legal opinions, it
should be clear that counsel runs a substantial risk of malpractice
liability to persons for whose reliance a negligently prepared unregistered stock sale opinion is intended.

In this section, the general

parameters of a lawyer's potential securities laws liability for unregistered stock sale opinions will be considered. Following an introductory analysis of the possible types of actions an opining lawyer
may be called on to defend under the securities laws, consideration

is given to three key areas of concern in assessing the lawyer's exposure qua lawyer under the securities laws for an erroneous opinion.
The first two areas concern the extent of a lawyer's obligation to see
that his opinion is right on both the facts stated and the law applied.
The third area for consideration is the principle that the lawyer's
exposure for his actions in a legal capacity is dependent upon his
acting as a "participant" in an illegal transaction.
(1)

Gradations in liability. Three types of actions may be

filed against a lawyer charged with violating the securities laws.
First, under rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice,96 the SEC is em-

powered to institute disciplinary proceedings against professionals
who, among other things, are believed by the Commission "to have
engaged in improper or unethical professional conduct. '9 7 Among
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970).
The section defines an underwriter as,
inter alia, "any person who . . .offers or sells for an issuer in connection with
the distribution of any security, or participates or has . . . a participation in any
such undertaking .... ." The SEC is of the view that the concept of "distribution" is vital to interpreting the meaning of "underwriter." SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972) (adoption of rule 144). In brief, the
Commission feels that the salient factors to be considered in evaluating whether a
person has engaged in a distribution are: (1) whether there is "adequate current
information concerning the issuer"; (2) the existence of a "holding period prior to
resale"; and (3) the "impact of the particular transaction or transactions on the
trading markets." Id. Where section 4(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1)
(1970), is used as a basis for exemption from registration, it is imperative that the
seller not be an "underwriter," for the section only exempts from registration
"transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or dealer."
95. The use of legal opinions by broker-dealers in the context of section 4(1)
exemptions is discussed in SEC Securities Exch. Act Release No. 6721 (Feb. 2, 1962).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1970).
97. Id. § 201.2(e)(1). See generally Comment, supra note 5.
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the sanctions that may be imposed upon an attorney found liable is
suspension of the right to practice before the Commission. The

second type of proceeding which may be brought against the attorney
is an action by the SEC for a civil injunction restraining the defend-

ant attorney from further violations. The National Student Marketing litigation mentioned in the introduction is such a case. This
type of action may serve as a basis for a later rule 2(e) proceeding
and may result in a contempt of court finding in the event of a subsequent securities laws violation by the enjoined lawyer. 98 The third

type of action that may arise from a lawyer's violation of the securities laws is the familiar civil action instituted by private litigants.

This type of remedy could come into play where counsel's opinion
furthers an illegal scheme involving the sale of unregistered stock.

In such a case counsel might be called on to defend suits brought under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act9 9 and section 10(b) of the
1934 Act' 00 and rule lOb-5 thereunder.' 0 ' Civil actions may be

brought under those sections for redress of fraud perpetrated in the
sale of securities.' 02

Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act 0 3 provides for

civil recovery from sellers who violate section 5 and has come into
play in unregistered stock sale suits against lawyers,

04

but the section

does not appear to hold much promise for plaintiffs seeking to recover from lawyers in opinion letter cases absent facts showing that
the defendant attorney was either a seller or solicited the illegal
sale.'

05

While the same sort of malfeasance may well expose an attorney to an adverse judgment in either the rule 2(e) disciplinary pro98. See note 4 and text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).

100. Id. § 78j(b).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
102. The two 1934 Act provisions are broader in scope, covering fraud perpetrated in connection with stock purchases as well as sales.

103. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970).
104. In Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH
FFn. SEC. L. REP.
91,034 at 93,458 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), defendant attorney was
charged with assisting in the illegal sale of unregistered securities in violation of
section 12(1). At trial it was shown that the lawyer's only contact with the
transaction in question involved his giving an oral opinion to one of the sellers to
the effect that the stock could be sold absent registration. The court held that
these facts were sufficient for venue purposes, but inadequate to make out a winning
case that the defendant attorney was a "seller" within the intent of the section.
Cf. Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965) (holding that an
attorney who had drafted assignments later found to be securities illegally sold
without registration was not a seller within the terms of the section since he had
not actually sold or solicited the sale of the securities).
105. See Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Colo. 1965).
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ceeding, injunction action, or private damage action, this is not to
say that there are no tangible gradations in the standards of conduct
which the different remedial frameworks encompass. To the contrary, the degree of culpability giving rise to a rule 2(e) action by the
Commission is arguably less than might be required to support an
injunction action. 106 Further, the level of culpability sufficient to
sustain entry of an injunction in favor of the SEC will not necessarily
support a judgment in a damage action brought by a private investor.' 07 Within these categories, however, there is obviously still
much room for the exercise of discretion.
Apart from the general statement that the burden of establishing
liability is more easily sustained in a rule 2(e) proceeding than in civil
litigation, it is hard to find articulated in the cases useful standards for
gauging the exposure of professionals for alleged wrongs in the
securities law field. One reason for this void is, as pointed out in the
next section, the paucity of decisions that consider the exposure of a
lawyer in his capacity as a lawyer without intermingling judgments
on the defendant lawyer's participation in the wrongdoing in some
other capacity. Another reason why the precedents may be somewhat
difficult to unscramble is related to the labels used by the courts in
deciding the standard of conduct required to establish antifraud
liability in an action for damages under section 10(b) and rule IOb-5.
For example, the Second and Fifth Circuits apparently require some
form of "scienter" to uphold a judgment of liability in a 10b-5 damage
action, although the requisite intent can probably be deduced from
gross negligence or recklessness.10 8 The Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and
perhaps Tenth Circuits have given some indication that scienter is
not a requirement under 10b-5, thus paving the way for a finding of
liability in the event of negligence.' 0 9
106. See TRANscmPT, supra note 14, at 123-24 (remarks of Professor Robert
H. Mundheim).
107. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 193
(1963); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC v. Great Am.
Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 460 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 290 (1970).
108. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
109. Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
852 (1970); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir.
1961). The Tenth Circuit's decision in Stevens should be compared with the
more recent and less liberal holding by the court in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). See
generally Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-.5, 67 Nw. U.L. RE'v. 562 (1972).
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While there are colorable reasons that may be cited in opposition to any securities law antifraud damage verdicts against lawyers

whose malpractice meets only a negligence standard,11° in actual
practice it will likely matter little whether a court demands proof of
110. For one thing, it may be argued that the states have a clear and strong
interest in governing the conduct of attorneys within their borders from the time
character references are first filled out in connection with completion of bar
examination applications through retirement, and that this important state interest
should not yield to federal intervention without good reason. Such federal intervention would come into play where, for example, a federal court finds counsel
liable under the securities laws for "negligence" by reason of his failure to undertake an investigation of facts presented by his client, with the duty to investigate
forming no part of the relevant state's malpractice law. Significant support for
this view that federal intervention may be improper in such circumstances is
found in the area of corporate fiduciary responsibilities where there is a comparable state interest. In judging breach of fiduciary duty claims alleged to arise under the securities laws, the federal judiciary has been known to refrain from usurping the province of the states to develop their own code of conduct for fiduciaries.
For the reasoning underlying this exercise of federal restraint, see Kaminsky v.
Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where the court stated:
The fiduciary responsibilities of corporate directors are . . defined
by the law of the state of incorporation. Federal legislation supersedes
state corporate law remedies only to the extent of any direct conflict between the two . . . and unless a matter is clearly covered exclusively by

federal statute it is deemed to be subject to state law. If Congress
had intended to preempt the entire field, "so revolutionary a federal
intervention," Loss says, "would presumably have been clearly expressed,"
II Loss, Securities Regulation 903. Thus, although federal securities
laws have been construed broadly in the light of their remedial purposes

. . . they remain "incomplete and interstitial" in nature . . . and do not

represent a federal corporate law with respect to responsibility of officers and directors that has supremacy over state law, which Congress has
never adopted. Id. at 504-05.
Accord, Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 809 (5th Cir. 1970). See Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403, 405-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Barnett v. Anaconda
Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). By the same token, it might be
argued that Congress has never adopted a plan that would permit federal courts
to usurp the state function of overseeing standards governing simple negligence
(as opposed to fraud) by professionals. It would seem that the SEC has power
already under rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice to discipline professionals who engage in unethical or improper professional conduct or, wilfull fraud. See Comment, supra note 5. There is no apparent reason for the federal judiciary to insert
itself into the negligent malpractice matrix under the guise of making determinations under "antifraud" provisions. But cf. TRANSCRuT, supra note 14, at 40,
where it is noted that "no matter what's in the Code, in the state statutes or in
the state cases, federal courts will end up applying federal rules in [the attorneyclient relationship] area."
Another reason why courts should be reluctant to award recovery under the
antifraud provisions for negligent malpractice is related to the major policy determination made in Ultramares of limiting suits brought by a member of a broad
class of allegedly injured persons. If this policy had vitality in 1931 when Ultramares was decided, it should have far greater force in this day of the ubiquitous
class action law suit in securities law cases.
Class actions seeking recovery at common law for negligent malpractice do
not pose a grave threat to professionals for a number of reasons. First, very few

400
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negligence, gross negligence or scienter. A court or jury convinced
that a defendant attorney ought to be held liable for an incorrect
states have embraced the class action as a legitimate device for awarding mass
recovery in cases where each class member has a separate claim for relief. Cf.
Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NomE DAME LAw. 663 (1970); Homburger,
State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1971); Wall
Street J., May 14, 1970, at 10, cols. 1-2. Second, class action relief in federal
diversity cases is limited by the requirement of Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969), that each class member have a claim for relief in excess of $10,000.
A recent case discussing this problem is Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469
F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972). Third, even where a state court might be willing to
entertain the suit, it may very well be unwilling to award relief to nonresident class
members. See Anthony v. General Motors Corp., No. 959,058 (Los Angeles
Calif. Super. Ct., Dec. 22, 1971); Robiner v. General Motors Corp., No. 172,865
(Wayne Cty. Mich. Cir. Ct., July 22, 1971) (both cases involve refusals by courts
to allow nationwide class actions in products liability cases). Finally, there is a
serious question whether the character of a malpractice suit based on alleged negligence lends itself to class action treatment. Because the nature of the wrong
claimed is negligence, each alleged class member would be required to establish
injury proximately caused by the asserted malpractice just as would be the case if
a class member sued individually. See, e.g., Note, Attorney Malpractice, supra
note 23, at 1307. This need for individual proof by each class member could very
well disqualify the suit from class action consideration by making the trial protracted and unmanageable. See Schaffner v. Chemical Bank, [1971-1972 Transfer
93,403 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Cannon v. Texas
Binder], CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
Gulf Sulphur Co., 53 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). On the other hand, a ruling
by the court that the burden of individual proof could be lessened or dispensed with
altogether because of the class action character of the litigation would amount
to modification of the requirements for a substantive cause of action by use of a
procedural rule. This development is offensive to our common law tradition and
could very well deprive a defendant of his fourteenth amendment right to assert
individual defenses which he might establish if he could confront each class member
individually. See American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932)
("Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available
defense.").
In sum, there is a good basis for belief that in malpractice suits alleging
common law negligence, the ascendancy of the class action device does not pose a
serious threat to the policy recognized in Ultramares. This would manifestly
not be the case should the antifraud provisions of the securities laws provide a
haven for malpractice actions based on negligent misconduct. Resort to the class
action device is well-recognized as a means of securing redress for alleged violations of the securities laws. See Annot., Propriety, Under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as Amended in 1966, of Class Action
for Violation of Federal Securities Laws, 9 A.L.R. Fed. 118 (1971); cf. "ADAM
SMITH," SUPERMONEY 166-69 (1972). This development makes likely the threat of
massive exposure of professionals for simple negligence if courts accept a diluted
definition of fraud in malpractice cases brought under the securities laws. It may
be argued that under these circumstances, allowance of class actions under the securities laws would clearly contravene the policy inherent in Ultramaresof limiting the
vistas of professional liability where there is no inference of fraud. Whether the
policy of Ultramares deserves to be protected from such inroads is, of course, a
different matter.
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opinion can easily categorize his performance as negligent if that will
suffice, or grossly negligent if that standard of misconduct is necessary to support a violation of the securities laws in the particular

jurisdiction.
(2)

The lawyer's responsibility to be right on the facts. In

1962 the SEC set forth the standard of care it felt was required of an
attorney called on to issue an unregistered stock sale opinion:
Obviously, an attorney's opinion... is worthless... if unspecified
but vital facts are not considered. Because of this, it is the practice
of responsible counsel not to furnish an opinion . . . unless such
counsel have themselves carefully examined all of the relative circumstances and satisfied themselves, to the extent possible, that the contemplated transaction is in fact, not a part of an unlawful distribution.
Indeed, if an attorney furnishes an opinion based solely upon hypothetical facts which he made no effort to verify, and if he knows that
his opinion will be relied upon as the basis for a substantial distribution of unregistered securities, a serious question arises as to the propriety of his professional conduct.1 1
The Commission's pointed comment questioning the propriety

of -the opining lawyer's professional conduct strongly indicates its
willingness to institute proceedings against wayward counsel under
rule 2(e). Assessing whether conduct that the SEC might label
"negligen' or "unprofessional" constitutes a basis for securities laws
liability is, as was noted, a task not made easier by the scarcity of case

law dealing with the issue.

While there is no great shortage of

cases and administrative actions finding actionable misconduct on the

part of counsel in connection with fraudulent schemes furthered by
the issuance of legal opinions,"' the attorney is often so closely asso111. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962).
112. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964) ("abundant evidence" that defendant attorney issued opinions freeing unregistered stock for sale
when he knew registration was required); SEC v. R.D. Philpot Indus., Inc., 73
Civ. 543 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 5, 1973), noted in N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1973, at 1,
cols. 4-5; United States v. Hamilton, No. 71 Cr. 780 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 27, 1972),
noted in Wall Street J., Sept. 28, 1972, at 3, col. 2; SEC v. Fields, 71 Civ.
5416 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 7, 1972), noted in Wall Street J., Dec. 14, 1971, at 14, col. 2;
SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc.
L REP.
93,232 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Marshall I. Stewart, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4829 (April 29, 1966) (rule 2(e) proceeding against defendant attorney for, inter alia, issuing groundless opinion letters as to availability of certain
securities laws exemptions); Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347 (1960) (rule
2(e) proceeding permanently disqualifying defendant attorney from practicing before the Commission for, inter alia, issuance of opinions freeing unregistered stock
for sale when he knew or should have known registration was required). A non-
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ciated with the wrongdoing that he is held liable as a primary wrongdoer in some other capacity than as a lawyer.
A recent and very notable exception to this type of case is SEC
v. Spectrum, Ltd."13 Spectrum involved the application to a concrete factual setting in an injunction action of the position taken by
the SEC in its 1962 release that some minimal level of factual inquiry is required of counsel who issue opinions freeing unregistered
stock for sale. The defendant attorney in Spectrum was hired by
one or more Spectrum Ltd. insiders of uncertain identity for the purpose of writing an opinion assessing the transferability kf over 2 million shares of unregistered stock. The lawyer had had no previous
dealings of any substance with Spectrum or its insiders before undertaking to write the first formal opinion letter of his ten-year legal
career in order to "free up" the stock. The shares in question had
been the subject of an opinion issued by Spectrum's corporate counsel before the defendant attorney arrived on .the scene. In that opinion Spectrum's counsel had"examined the transferability of some 4.6
million shares and decided that the representations of Spectrum insiders warranted 2.6 million shares being restricted. The company's
lawyer would have allowed the remaining 2 million shares to be
"'freed-up'

. . . merely because he had no documentation . . . to

the contrary."" 4 Subsequent to rendering this opinion, the corporation's counsel wrote a letter to Spectrum's president listing the shareholders who held freely transferable stock.
After he was approached and asked to write an opinion freeing
the 2 million shares for sale, the defendant attorney met with Spectrum's corporate counsel. At that meeting the company's regular
lawyer allegedly gave four reasons why he did not want to write an
opinion letter for the defendant's client: (1) as company counsel he
had no duty to do so; (2) he had already prepared an earlier opinopinion letter case worthy of note is SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
In Frank, the defendant attorney was charged with having drafted a prospectus
that allegedly contained false representations concerning the efficacy of a chemical
additive developed by the issuer. In defense it was argued that the attorney was
only a scrivener and that any liability should be assessed against management
whose representations the attorney merely placed "in proper form," not his own.
388 F.2d at 488. The court rejected this position out of hand:
A lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a statement with regard
to securities which he knows to be false simply because his client has furnished it to him. ...
A •lawyer,
no more than others, can escape liability for fraud by closing
his eyes to what he saw and could readily understand. Id.
93,631, at 92,864
113. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
114. Id. at 92,866.
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ion concluding that the stock was transferable; (3) he wanted to
avoid binding himself to the financial community; and (4) he suspected that the stock the defendant had been asked to free would
be traded by a control person in violation of the securities laws. 1I5
This last representation allegedly made to the defendant was found
by the court to be the "only evidence imputing to [defendant's]
knowledge of any possible illegality""" and was eventually evaluated
as hardly credible." 17
Employing copies of agreements for the issuance of the shares
under consideration and using the opinion letter and shareholder list
earlier prepared by Spectrum's counsel in what appears to have been
a cut-and-paste fashion, the defendant reached the "opinion" that
the stock was not required to be registered under the securities laws.
Though the narrow scope of the defendant's factual study was not
stated in the opinion, the cover letter transmitting the opinion pointed
out that the defendant had made no factual investigation and was relying only upon the facts as represented to him. Moreover, the transmittal letter stated that the opinion was for the personal use of the
addressee, one Doyen, and was not to be given to any broker or
dealer for the purpose of inducing the sale of unregistered Spectrum
shares.
The defendant's opinion having proved to be groundless, the
SEC sought an injunction to restrain him from violating the securities laws. The Commission asserted that the defendant had violated
the 1933 Act directly by furthering the sale of unregistered shares as
a statutory underwriter in violation of section 5,118 and also indirectly
by having aided and abetted" 9 a scheme fraudulent under section
17(a), section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 (consisting of the unlawful
sale of unregistered Spectrum shares to pay off personal debts owed
by insiders).
The court refused to find for the SEC on either charge. The
SEC's claim that the defendant was an underwriter was rejected on
the ground that there was "no evidence that any such unregistered
securities were sold on the basis of the letter,"' 2 0 and the court
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 92,867.
118. See note 94 supra.
119. For the definitive treatment of aider and abettor liability, see Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pan Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. Ruv.
597 (1972).
120. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RP.
93,631, at 92,867.
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found no authority for the view that "mere preparation of an opinion
letter is sufficient to make the preparer an underwriter.' 121 The
Commission's "aider and abettor" claim was likewise rejected. In
brief, for aider and abettor liability to exist under the securities laws,
three things must happen: first, there must be an independent
wrong; second, the alleged aider and abettor must have "knowledge"
of the misconduct (which may be shown by reckless conduct or
by inference); 12 2 and third, he must give some quantum of assistance to the wrongdoing.2' Finding neither direct nor circumstantial evidence of knowledge of the improper scheme, the court held
that, while defendant "may have been guilty of some negligence,
there is insufficient evidence to support anything more serious than
that."'1 24 The court's refusal to place the defendant's actions in the
garb of stock fraud is understandable in light of its clear belief that
121. Id.
122. Ruder, supra note 119, at 638. Cf. United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877,
880-81 (2d Cir. 1973), which is briefly discussed at text accompanying notes
188-90 infra. In the case of SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972), the Seventh Circuit seemed to cast doubt on the
validity of the knowledge requirement by holding a brokerage firm liable under
the securities laws as an aider and abettor of the fraud perpetrated by its deceased
president. The firm had no knowledge of wrongdoing, and the only assistance it
could be said to have given the wrongdoing was in representing that its president
had provided sound investment counsel and acquiescing in the president's "enforcement of a rule regarding the opening of mail which was antithetical to the
prevention of frauds of the type which occurred." 463 F.2d at 988. Apparently
the court felt that the firm's acquiescence in the president's mail opening rule
constituted sufficient recklessness to satisfy the knowledge requirement for aider
and abettor liability. While there is merit to the court's additional findings that
the firm was liable as a principal under agency theory, as a controlling person
under the section 20(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970), and for
violation of rule 27 of the National Association of Securities Dealers' Rules of Fair
Practice, CCH NASD MANUAL
2177 (1972), it can be argued that the court
missed the mark in its aider and abettor analysis. As one respected commentator
has pointed out, brokerage firms owe direct obligations to the public, including the
duty to supervise their employees, and breach of such duties would seem to give
rise to direct, not secondary, liability. Ruder, supra note 119, at 599-600, 645-46.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the area of aider and abettor liability based on participation with "less than actual knowledge" is destined to be
"the focal point for expanding liabilities" under the securities laws. TRANSCRIPT,
supra note 14, at 265-66 (remarks of Martin Lipton). If so, the seemingly tame
brand of recklessness found to be a sufficient basis for liability in First Securities
raises some interesting questions for lawyers. For example, does a law firm that
fails to establish adequate procedures for review of its lawyers' work run the risk of
aiding and abetting a securities law violation committed by one of its lawyers?
Some general guidelines drafted to assist attorneys in avoiding this problem in an
opinion letter setting are set forth at pp. 433-39 infra.
123. Ruder, supranote 119, at 630.
124. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FaD. SEC. L. REP. % 93,631, at 92,868.
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the SEC had pursued the wrong man. Speaking of Spectrum's corporate counsel who had drafted the opinion originally freeing the
stock "merely because he had no documentation . . . to the con-

trary,""l2 ' the court stated that he "must consider himself indeed
fortunate not to be named as a defendant herein. ... "I"
We see in Spectrum a good deal ,ofcompassion for misled counsel. The court's finding of "some negligence" by the defendant is
clear recognition that his conduct did not meet the standard of care
established by the SEC in its 1962 release. Yet the court held the
degree of recklessness required to tip the degree of care exhibited
into the fraud category to be absent. The decisive factor here apparently was the defendant's ability to point to the cover letter accompanying his opinion as proof that sale of the securities in reliance
on the opinion was not anticipated. A less lenient judge might have
wondered to what other use the defendant reasonably expected his
opinion to be put.
The defendant in Spectrum obviously had a very close call.
The court's comment regarding the likely liability of Spectrum's
counsel strongly suggests that a lawyer's rendition of an opinion
freeing stock for sale simply because insiders have failed to volunteer a reason for restriction can amount to misconduct punishable
under the securities laws. Some inquiry is clearly required by the
SEC's release, but where the limits are to be drawn is a matter that
must depend on the facts of the particular situation.'
An opinion
requested by a long-time client having an unblemished record of fair
disclosure of all salient facts will likely require a good deal less in
the way of independent investigation than an opinion rendered on
behalf of a new client or a client known to be in financial difficulties
or known to have been less than candid in his disclosure of factual
matters in the past. Further, it would seem to be a sound policy to
point out specifically in the body of the opinion letter itself the scope
of the investigation conducted and the extent to which representations of others are relied upon.
Since the defendant's opinion was judged as an original work
product, the court in Spectrum never took up the issue of counsel's
exposure for relying on an erroneous opinion prepared by another
125. Id. at 92,866.
126. Id. at 92,868.
127. A general discussion of the lawyer's duty to investigate facts is set forth in
TRANscRiPT, supra note 14, at 125-31, 176-78. In the course of the discussion,
securities lawyer A. A. Sommer expressed his view that "[tihe language of Rule
10b-5 can certainly be construed to regard a lawyer who renders an opinion without reasonable investigation as engaged in a deceptive act or practice." Id. at 177.
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lawyer. The experience of accountants sheds some light on the is2 the defendant accountant relied upon
sue. In Beardsley v. Ernst,"'
financial results certified by an opinion prepared by a European auditor. Reliance on the foreign financial statements was disclosed in
the defendant's audit certificate, and the court held that this disclosure insulated the defendant from liability when the financials relied
upon proved misleading. A recent Statement on Auditing Procedure
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Committee on Auditing Procedure provides some additional guidance on
the issue of reliance on opinions prepared by others. 2 ' The Statement requires that, "whether or not" the principal auditor decides to
disclose reliance on another auditor's examination, he must at a minimum satisfy himself as to the other auditor's independence and professional reputation. If the principal auditor is able to satisfy himself as to the accuracy of the other auditor's opinion, he may express
an opinion on the audit as a whole without reference to the other
auditor's work. Otherwise, disclosure of the other auditor's participation should be made, with a clear indication of the division of responsibilities between the auditors. There seems no reason why
these basic requirements of satisfaction as to reputation, independence and result (or disclosure of outside participation) should not
govern in the area of legal opinions.'80
(3) The lawyer's responsibilityto be right on the law. Again,
we return to the proposition that the area of categorizing conduct as
negligent, grossly negligent, heedless or fraudulent in the malpractice
field is very mushy turf. In the California Supreme Court case of
Lucas v. Hamm, 81 discussed in connection with the standard of care
for malpractice, the defendant escaped liability for "negligent" malpractice where a provision of the will in question was drafted in violation of state statutory law, and the error in question had been the
subject of decisions already decided when the will was drafted.
The court felt that the statute was too complex to hold that its viola128. 47 Ohio App. 241, 191 N.E.2d 808 (1934).
129. CoMM. ON AUDITING PROCEDURE OF THE
FIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS,

AMERICAN INSTrTUTE OF CERTISTATEMENT ON AUDITING PROCEDURE No. 45, USING

(1971). The Statement discusses cases where
auditors rely on other auditors. Where reliance cuts across professional lines, it
has been suggested that the reliant professional should not incur liability if he acts
in "good faith." TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 233-34 (remarks of Victor M.
Earle, 431 147.6 Tm 31
THE WORK OF OTHER AUDITORS
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tion by an attorney constituted negligent malpractice. Recall also,
however, that California is the leading state to have abandoned the
privity requirement for attorneys' liability to third parties. It may
very well be that as the vistas of liability have expanded in California, the boundaries of what is a substantive wrong have shrunk.
Perhaps this same phenomenon will soon appear on the securities
laws scene if, indeed, it has not already arrived in the form of Spectrum.

In any event, there are minimal levels below which conduct may
not sink without becoming too heedless to be called mere negligence.
In distinguishing the situation in Ultramares, Judge Cardozo provided the example of an audit certificate from which it could be in'
ferred that the preparer had "no genuine belief in its accuracy."132
SEC v. Century Investment Transfer Corp.1 3 3 is an opinion letter

case involving similarly indefensible conduct.
In Century Investment Transfer, the SEC based its charges of

violation of the antifraud provisions of section 17(a), section 10(b),
and rule lOb-5 on the defendant attorney's issuance of opinion letters saying that unregistered stock could be sold despite clear statutory language to the contrary. In summing up its view of the defendant attorney's misconduct, the court stated:
Caldwel's preparation of misleading opinion letters which were
crucial to distribution of the unregistered securities is sufficient to
find him an aider and abettor of the scheme in deciding the motion
for a preliminary injunction. .

.

. His statements go beyond being

mere mistakes in legal judgment to constitute13 probable
violations of
4
the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.

In attempting to gauge the reasonablness of an investigation
into a legal matter, the logical starting place is a study of the character of the misconstrued authority giving rise to the erroneous judgment. On this point the same sort of misconduct was involved in
Lucas v. Hamm and Century Investment Transfer, since attorneys in

both cases misconstrued statutes. In the California case the statute
was the highly complex Rule Against Perpetuities, and in the Century Investment Transfer case the statute was a straightforward provision of the 1933 Act that made the necessity for registration clear.
The grey area between these poles is plainly a wide one.
Counsel may expect that every opinion dealing with matters of
legal interpretation carries an implied representation of reasonable
132. 255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
133. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
134. Id. at 91,443.

1 93,232 at 91,437
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professional care and skill. Where what might be expected to be a
normal investigation has been limited by design or necessity, this
qualification should be pointed out. Similarly, where counsel advocates a view that runs counter to existing authority on point, including administrative rulings, prudence would seem to require that the
authority be noted and distinguished. Further, unless counsel can
feel completely confident that his opinion will not be relied on-and
that he can attract a Spectrum-style sympathy vote if it is-he should
make clear and concise note of all qualifications directly in the text
of the opinion itself, not just in the cover letter.
(4) The lawyer as a participantin the transaction. In the fall
of 1971 SEC Commissioner Philip A. Loomis, Jr. cautioned that
the SEC had concluded that when attorneys go beyond their traditional role as private counselors to hold themselves out in a way
that encourages investor reliance, they assume public responsibilities
under the securities laws that might not otherwise apply:
We are concerned and inclined to feel that counsel who participate in
action by a corporation have some public responsibility to investors
and stockholders and not solely to corporate management.'" 5
One familiar example of such participation is the use of opinions in the sale of unregistered stock, as in Spectrum and Century
Investment Transfer. In this type of situation the lawyer's opinion
takes on the characteristics of an affirmative representation like the
certificate of title in Ward. What is needed to establish participation in a transaction violating the securities laws is some sort of reasonable nexus between the attorney's conduct and the harm complained of. While an opinion letter may satisfy the nexus requirement, mere consultation with a client will not, unless, of course, the
consultation is directed toward furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.
Wessel v. Buhler'36 is an example of a court's refusal to allow
recovery in a suit where there was no nexus between the defendant's
professional conduct and the wrong for which the plaintiffs sought
redress. In the Wessel case the Ninth Circuit refused to find an accountant liable under rule lOb-5 either directly or as an aider and
abettor where his only activity was the preparation of financial statements for management. The financials were not prepared for the
use of plaintiffs, and there was no evidence that the plaintiffs even
knew of the statements until after the suit was brought. Under these
135. N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
136. 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
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circumstances, the court was unwilling to hold that the accountant
owed any independent duty to disclose the sorry state of his client's
financial affairs to prospective investors:
We find nothing in Rule 10b-5 that purports to impose liability
on anyone whose conduct consists solely of inaction. .

.

. On the

contrary, the exposure of independent accountants and others to such
vistas of liability, limited only by the ingenuity of investors and their
137
counsel, would lead to serious mischief.
A seemingly extreme example of participation is presented in
the 1971 Oregon district court decision of Black & Co. v. NovaTech, Inc.138 In Black, the issue before the court was whether it
could assert long-arm jurisdiction over California lawyers alleged to
have participated in the sale of unregistered securities in Oregon in
violation of Oregon blue sky laws, section 10(b), and rule 10b-5.
The court held that the facts established sufficient participation by
the firm and one of its lawyers named individually to vest it with
long-arm jurisdiction. For Oregon blue sky purposes, the individual lawyer was held to have participated in the allegedly illegal distribution merely because "without his assistance [in preparing legal
documents], the sale would not have been accomplished."' 139 The
court said that this result would obtain "[e]ven if [the lawyer] did
not know and could not have known of Nova-Tech's failure to register the securities ..
,140 A similarly expansive view of partici"..
pation was taken with regard to the law firm itself. Designation
of the firm as the issuer's corporate counsel in its annual reports was
held sufficient to make the firm's partners participants for process
purposes with respect to the blue sky claim in any unlawful securities
transaction in which the annual reports were used.
Lawyers familiar with "doing business" problems know that
there is a vast difference between what constitutes doing business for
purpose of service of process or venue as opposed to doing business
in the substantive "qualification!' sense.141 This dichotomy obviously applies in cases involving participation for purposes of exposure under the securities laws, as demonstrated by the ruling in
137. Id. at 283. The Wessel case is discussed in Ruder, supra note 119 at 642-44.
Professor Ruder points out that the "duty to warn" aspect of the holding can be
better rationalized in terms of breach of a direct duty to disclose rather than in
terms of secondary aider and abettor liability.
138. 333 F. Supp. 468 (D. Ore. 1971).
139. Id. at 472.

140. Id.
141. E.g., 17 W. FLErcHER,
T=ONS § 8465 (1960).

CYcLoPEDA

oF THE LAW oF PiuvATE CopoRA-
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Black. Simply put, the flimsy types of nexus demanded by the
court in Black to establish participation for jurisdictional purposes
make no sense from the standpoint of gauging participation for purposes of substantive liability. The disclosure philosphy of the securities laws is designed to insure that "what you see is what you get;" if
there has been no misplaced reliance, there should be no civil recovery in damage suits absent proof that the lawyer knowingly assisted
others in perpetrating a fraud.
Taken together, the cases indicate that where counsel authors
opinions in the securities area with the object of promoting action by
others, he may expect to be held accountable for misconduct sufficiently heedless to permit an inference of fraud. The Ninth Circuit in
Wessel held that proof of some type of direct communication between
the attorney and the claimants would be necessary before the accountant's actions could be assailed under either direct liability or
aider and abettor theories. Spectrum, however, gives evidence that
proof of reliance by investors is not essential for aider and abettor
liability in an SEC injunction action. The court in Spectrum, although well aware that the public had not relied on the defendant
attorney's opinion, excused him from liability not on the basis of
nonreliance, but because there was no evidence of the defendant's
knowledge of fraud. In sum, though Wessel indicates liability to third
parties in damage suits will hinge in part on proof of reliance, Spectrum implicitly recognizes that counsel have an obligation to perform a "gatekeeper" function, and that conduct more culpable than
simple negligence will vest the SEC with a cause of action regardless
of whether investors directly rely on the attorney in the transaction
in question, and irrespective of whether the defendant attorney functions only as an attorney (as did the lawyers in Spectrum and the defendant attorney in Century Investment Transfer). The lawyer may
say nothing, but the talking done by the opinion letter will be heard
142
by the courts.
Once participation in a transaction by rendition of an opinion
letter takes place, facts may be discovered that cast doubt on the
validity of conclusions reached in the opinion. In assessing counsel's
responsibility for subsequently discovered facts, we again look to
142. For additional authority supporting this basic theme, see United States v.
Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964) (discussed
at text accompanying notes 191-92 infra); cf. United States v. Sarantos, 445 F.2d
877 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussed at text accompanying notes 188-90 infra); SEC v.
Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968) (discussed at note 112 supra). See also Comment, supra note 5, at 1012-16.
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the experience of the accounting profession for assistance. It will be
recalled that in Wessel the court was unwilling to find that the defendant accountant had a duty to "blow the whistle' on his client
absent some sort of pre-existing relationship between the accountant
and plaintiffs. Fischer v. Kletz' 43 provides us with a case where
there was such a pre-existing relationship. In Fischer, the district
court refused to dismiss claims asserted against Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. which arose out of the firm's certification of financials appearing in Yale Express System, Inc.'s 1963 annual report. The plaintiffs alleged that although the defendant accounting
firm became aware sometime before the end of 1964 that the certified financials were materially misleading, it failed to make this information public until May of 1965. The court held that the plaintiffs had stated causes of action under common law deceit theory as
well as under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. In so holding, the court
observed that "[tihe common law has long required that a person who
has made a representation must correct that representation if it becomes false and if he knows people are relying on it.' 144 The lesson
of the Fischer case as to the duty of an accountant to disclose subsequently discovered information of a material nature exisiting at the
date of his report has since been embodied in a Statement.on Auditing Procedure promulgated by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants. 1 45 As was the case in the area of professionals'
reliance on opinions prepared by others, there seems to be no reason
why a court should require less of lawyers who participate in a transaction by rendering opinions than it would demand of accountants
14 6
whose audit certificates are relied upon.
143. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
144. Id. at 188. The court also refused to dismiss the plaintiff's claim that the
defendants had violated section 18(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970), by
permitting the company to file with the SEC a 10-K report containing financial
statements known by the defendants to be false and misleading. Id. at 189.
145. COMm. ON AUDImNG PROcEDURE, AMEmCAN INSTrruTE OF CETimp PUBLiC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON AuDrrNG PRocEDURE No. 41, SUBSEQUENT DisCOVERY OF FACTs EXIsTING AT THE DATE OF THE Atmrroi's REPORT (1969). Cf.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLic AccoUNTANTs, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHIcs AND INTERPRETATIvE OPINIONS 16-17 (1971).
Interpretative Opinion No. 8

provides in part:
In a circumstance where a member believes the financial statements are
false or misleading as a whole or in any significant respect, it is the
opinion of the committee that he should require adjustments of the accounts or adequate disclosure of the facts, as the case may be, and falling
this the independent accountant should refuse to permit his name to be
associated with the statements in any way. Id. at 17.
146. See TRANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 243-44 (stating that the question is not
whether an accountant or a lawyer has a duty to disclose subsequently discovered
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THE National Student Marketing CASE
The significance of the SEC's complaint in the NationalStudent
Marketing action transcends the allegations and theories of relief
there asserted to touch the very essence of the American legal profession at this point in history. One legal historian has pointed out
that about a century ago it was the opinion letter that served as the
vehicle which brought lawyers into increasingly closer contact with
their business clients, as businessmen began to seek the judgments
of the leading advocates of the day. 147 Today we see the opinion
letter again serving as the catalyst for change.
In this portion of the article the significance of the SEC's
charges is explored from several perspectives. First, we shall examine some of the forces at work within the legal profession that
help to explain why the SEC's action was taken at this juncture.
Following that inquiry, a brief analysis of recent developments under the securities laws relating to the exposure of professionals for
fraud and malpractice serves to introduce an examination of the opinion letter claims asserted by the SEC. These discussions in turn set
the stage for a synthesis set forth in the next section of the article in
the form of a "model code" of policies and procedures for use in
preparing legal opinions.
Ideas in the Air
In his latest work, that well known stock market seer "Adam
Smith" takes time to remind us that
[w]e ignore revolutions at our peril. Current evidences may or
may not lead to profound changes, but we know that even when
changes seem to happen quickly,48the ideas behind them have been
hanging in the air for a long time.'
pre-existing facts, but how soon after discovery must he comply with that duty).
On this latter point Mr. Abraham Pomerantz took the view that prompt disclosure
was required:
mhe point is that the moment you are put on notice that your statement may be false, it's your duty to hurry up and get your night
shifts working to get at the facts and then promptly, without fooling
around, say to the public, "We are sorry, but this statement was inaccurate, through no fault of ours. Our client did not tell us the truth or
such an item showed up or it was an innocent error," what have you.
I don't care about semantics. What's important is when you say
the earnings are $11.12 a share and it turns out they are zero a share,
I think it's shocking to sit quiet, sit on your hands, and permit your good
name . . . to act as a perpetual representation, and by hypothesis, a
perpetual rigging of the market, because it is market manipulation to permit false statements to circulate over your signature. My Godl Id.
at 244-45.
147. 1. HuRsT, TiE GROWTH OF Am CamcA
L.Aw 303 (1950).
148. SUPERMONEY, supra note 110, at 282.
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So it goes for an attorney's responsibilities under the securities laws
vis-h-vis his corporate client, the SEC and the investing public.
At the outset of this article it was noted that the development of
the symbiotic relationship between the legal profession and its corporate clients did not draw rave reviews in all quarters.149 At the
core of the critics' arguments was the fear that the legal profession
risked diminishing its stature and independence of thought and action
by rushing pell-mell to satisfy the great demands of its corporate
clients.

The SEC's complaint in the National Student Marketing

case gives us reason to reflect anew on these venerable insights.
At another point in the introductory section of this paper, it
was noted that these are times of expanding constituencies generally,
with more stringent standards of conduct coming to the fore. 5 ' In
an age when the chief executive officer of the world's largest corporation feels compelled to make a public apology to a private citizen,' 5 ' it is only natural that members of a profession historically
vested with a public trust be held to a standard of accountability
that accurately reflects the tenor of the times. California's Supreme
Court has already recognized this truth;' 2 other courts can be expected to follow. But while there is some of this "new morality" at
work in the SEC's complaint, it is by no means the primary ingredient.
The influence that can be viewed as the essential ingredient in
the SEC's complaint has less to do with abstract generalizations
about public responsibility than with the hard realities of what makes
the stock market work. Again, we have insight from "Adam Smith,"
that "the market does not follow logic, it follows some mysterious
tides of mass psychology.' 53 And as Mr. Smith informs us, the key
component determining the direction and substance of that mass
psychology is the belief on the part of an investor that he is getting a
fair value for his investment dollar:
[T]he actions of all investors, individual and institutional, professional and nonprofessional, have to be based on the belief that leadership knows what it is doing and that rational men are handling the
nation's business rationally. If that belief fades, then so do the markets. They do not merely dive, they dive and they disappear. It
149. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
150. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
151. One journalist's view of the facts surrounding this incident is set forth in
T. WHI EsIDE, TH.E INVESTIGATION OF RALPH NADER (1972).
152. See notes 58 & 61 supra and accompanying text.
153. "ADAM SMrTH," THE MONEY GAME 236-37 (1968).
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happened here in the blight of the spirit from 1930 to 1933, and it
has happened in other countries.
Can it all come tumbling down? In a paper market, based on
belief, this fear is universal, no matter how deep it is buried. Sure, it
can all come tumbling down. All it takes is for belief to go away. 1 4
Seen against the backdrop of such debacles as Continental Vending,
Westec and Penn Central,' 55 the SEC's National Student Marketing
complaint appears as an effort to bolster confidence in the securities
markets by impressing corporate managements and their advisors
with the magnitude of their responsibilities under the securities laws
and with the potential for personal and professional humiliation as
a penalty for failure to discharge those responsibilities. 5
In line with this need to foster investor confidence in the integrity of the securities markets is the movement by the SEC in its National Student Marketing charges to bring about a state of parity between the professions in terms of their public responsibilities. The
inevitability of this development has been apparent for some time.
The reported reaction to the 1968 decision of Escott v. BarChris
Construction Corp. 51 reveals the extent to which lawyers and accountants had become accustomed to thinking in terms of their public responsibilities:
154. Id. at 283-84. As proof of his thesis, Mr. Smith relates a conversation he
had with his friend Charlie, "a master gunslinger running a very aggressive fund,"
on a day stock prices plunged:
Charlie and I drift back to his office. "It's a terrible market for
everybody but me," Charlie says. "Nobody believes anything. They
don't believe Johnson, they don't believe anything in Washington, they
believe taxes are going to go up but not enough, they don't believe we
will ever get out of Vietnam, and after Motorola, nobody will believe any
earnings. Let Peat Marwick the CPA's certify them, they still won't believe them." Id. at 242.
As noted by Mr. Smith, the Depression stands as stark testimony to the
tendency of irrational behavior on the part of businessmen to prompt financial
ruin and undermine investor confidence in the fair and effective functioning of the
securities markets. But common sense warns that investor confidence does not
die only when it is crushed in a massive depression, for belief can be bled dry
slowly, with the collapse of one company after another eventually taking its toll.
155. For insights into these instances of managerial malfeasance, see respectively, United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1006 (1970); Wall Street J., Oct. 3, 1972, at 1, col. 6; Letter of Transmittal,
SEC Staff Study of the Financial Collapse of the Penn Central Co., CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 1 78,931 (1972). These and other fiascos are illumined in A. BRILOFF, UNACCOUNTABLE ACCOUNTING (1972).
156. The need for protecting the public's belief in the fairness of the securities
markets was a theme often stressed by former SEC Chairman William J. Casey.
E.g., Casey, The SEC's Strategy for Increasing Investor Confidence in the Integrity of Our CapitalMarkets, 28 Bus. LAw. 537 (1973).
157. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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What upsets the financial community is that some of the defendants-found careless by the judge---did as much checking as many
of their colleagues do in similar situations ....
"We'd get fired if we asked to see the backlog contracts," says
one Wall Street lawyer.
"This decision will give any lawyer the willies," says another
Wall Streeter. "You have to say, 'Oh, we've been doing this all
along,' But the fact is we haven't."
An accountant says this interpretation of due diligence is harsh.
But he adds: "We've been burnt in court before. It's the lawyers
and underwriters who aren't used to the law looking over their
158
shoulder like this.'
The handwringing with which the legal profession greeted BarChris was in large part attributable to recognition by attorneys that
standards of diligence throughout the securities bar generally had
slipped..' 9 Still, there was some cause for relief in Judge McLean's
ruling that it was the defendant accountants, not the lawyer who
prepared the registration statement, who were considered to be "experts" under section 11 of the 1933 Act.5 0 Thus, the "them and
us" attitude survived intact. From the omniscience of hindsight
we can see that too few lawyers looked beyond the specific terms of
the BarChris case to the threat of exposure to liability under the
securities laws for their opinion letters. Those who did assess the
implications of BarChris know that there was more than a grain of
truth in the view that
[a] lot of lawyers can take lessons from accountants. The accounting profession has been justifiably frightened by some law suits against
auditors of the highest caliber, with the result that they are more
visibly articulating positions."'
The truth of this comment is evidenced by the existence of the recent
Statements on Auditing Procedure,0 2 relied upon in preceding sections of this article, which cover topics such as the use of other
auditors' opinions and subsequent discovery of facts affecting the
validity of an audit certificate. 6 '
158. Wall Street J.,
May 14, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
159. BarChris Institute, supra note 67, at 550 & 554, 561, 621 (remarks of F.
Arnold Daum, Ralph H. Demmler and Kenneth J.Bialkin, respectively).
160. The concept of a lawyer acting as an expert under section 11 was discussed
earlier in connection with the analysis of accountants' letters and opinion rendered
in the course of work on public offerings. See notes 74-83 supra and accompanying text.
161. PLI, PRoTmc'ro Tn CoPoRATE OFFIcER AND DmcroR FROM LIAnBiLiy
28 (1970) (remarks of Alan Appelbaum).
162. For example see notes 129, 145 supra and accompanying text.
163. Remarks attributed to an "SEC official" in a recent study of changing re-
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Implicit in the idea of the National Student Marketing complaint as representing a sort of SEC "crackdown" on the legal profession is the proposition that the profession has failed to discharge
adequately its vital task of self-regulation. Reliable evidence suggests that this is the case. In 1969 the American Bar Association's
Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement commenced its report on the results of its three-year study of professional
discipline by saying that it had discovered "a scandalous situation
that requires the immediate attention of the profession."' 164 The report went on to note that lawyers' views toward disciplinary enforcement ranged "from apathy to outright hostility."'' 51 Another recent
study by the American Bar Foundation was synthesized in a report
that included the finding of "too little evidence of professional as
opposed to trade performance by the individual lawyer and no evidence of serious professional self-regulation toward diverting the profession to the pursuit of the common g6od-the public interest."'0 0
'One example of the fruits of this legacy of inadequate self-regulation by the legal profession is the current state of uncertainty
among securities lawyers as to counsel's responsibility regarding public disclosure of a potential material adverse development, the occurrence of which is contingent on some other event (such as suit before
the running of the statute of limitations). Does counsel have an
obligation to risk turning such a contingent liability into an actual
one by disclosing the as yet undiscovered discrepancy in periodic
reports filed with the SEC 0 7 that would be open to inspection by the
public? To answer the question requires that a lawyer review several different levels of competing policy considerations, for the dilemma of whether counsel must risk turning a contingent liability
sponsibilities of securities counsel likewise recognize that lawyers have lagged
behind accountants in articulating standards of professional conduct. The official
is said to have remarked that, compared to the legal profession, "the accounting
profession has been much more solicitous of SEC opinion concerning professional
standards." See The Changing Responsibilities of Securities Counsel, BNA SEC.
REG. &. L. REP. No. 109, at B-5 (1971). The official is also reported to have
asked, "[Wihy isn't the American Bar Association ever down here to discuss
problems that attorneys have?" Id.
164.

ABA

SPECIAL COMM.

ON

EVALUATION

OF DISCIPLNARY

ENFORCEMENT,

PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (1969).

165. Id.
166. F. MARKS, K. LESWING & B. FORTsNKI, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 288 (1972).

167. The reports might include Form 8-K and Form 10-K,
249.308, .310 (1972). Form 8-K is used for current reports required
or rule 15d-11, id. §§ 240.13a-11, .15d-11. Form 10-K is used for
required under sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1970).

17 C.F.R. §§
by rule i3a-ll
annual reports
Act of 1934,
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into an actual one involves a choice on several different levels between obligations owed by lawyers. At one level there is the need
to pick between the lawyer's duty to look after his client's' 68 financial
welfare which will suffer if the contingent liability becomes an actual
one because of disclosure, and his duty of fairness and candor to
the SEC. At another level there is the choice to be made between
the financial interests of current shareholders, whose equity stake
may be depleted if disclosure is made, and investors who might defer
a decision to buy the company's stock if the true state of affairs
were known. On yet another level there is the need for the lawyer
to decide between the wishes and self-interest of management, perhaps his close personal friends, and the abstract public responsibility
lawyers owe because of their professional status. Respected commentators have taken opposing views as to the proper answer to
this type of hypothetical.'6 9
We have already seen evidence of a growing trend toward increased recognition of the public trust inherent in the lawyer's status
as a professional. One example is the California Supreme Court's
168. As pointed out in note 16 supra, according to the Code of Professional
Responsibility a corporate lawyer's "client" is "the entity and not .-. . a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with
the entity."
169. At a recent Practising Law Institute gathering, the participants discussed
the question of whether counsel should disclose such a contingent liability. The
Practising Law Institutes Fourth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation was
held in New York City on Nov. 2-4, 1972. In the problem posed, no prior opinion by counsel was affected by the problem. (It was conceded that Fischer v.
Kletz would govern where the discovery affected a previously issued opinion on
which reliance could still be placed). In addressing the contingent liability hypothetical, former StC Commissioner Francis M. Wheat indicated that an attorney
has no duty to "blow the whistle" on his client by disclosing the problem in a report filed with the SEC. Not surprisingly, exactly the opposite position was taken
by another member of the PLI panel, Irving M. Pollack, Director of the SEC's
Division of Enforcement. Surely there can be no question of the eminence or good,
faith of either Mr. Wheat or Mr. Pollack. Just as surely, the issue involved is a
vastly important one, reaching to the heart of the corporate lawyer's responsibilities to management, shareholders, the corporate entity, the SEC and the investing public. And the hypothetical can ultimately have only one correct answer.
Some indication of the thoughts of Congress on the matter may be found in sections 18 and 32 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78r, ff (1970). Those sections
provide in turn for civil and criminal liability on the part of any person who
knowingly makes or causes to be made any statement in a report filed under the
law that is "false or misleading with respect to any material fact." Case law
also casts doubt on the propriety of counsel's advising his client to file a false
report. See United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1972), where
the Second Circuit stated: "We have held and continue to hold that [an attorney]
cannot counsel others to make statements in the face of obvious indications of
which he is aware that those assertions are not true."
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declaration that the lawyer's "responsibility must broaden and deepen" as more individuals find it increasingly necessary to rely upon
his expertise. 170 Unfortunately, connecting the dots that mark this
inevitable trend are judicial decisions involving fractured professional

careers.

The National Student Marketing drama should teach the

bar that litigation is a distasteful and unnecessary way to go about
the job of professional development. If it does, and if the formula-

tion of workable guidelines to govern the conduct of corporate counsel results, then our hypothetical need not be answered in the courts.

Viewed in the light of the American Bar Association and American Bar Federation commentaries and the uncertainty over the

right answer to the contingent liability hypothetical, the SEC's decision to become the legal profession's policeman is understandable.
Even more than being understandable, the Commission's new role
as policeman is symbolic of the truism that the times have changed,
for it was just slightly over twenty years ago that the Commission itself was drawing intense criticism for its seeming failure to probe
diligently the circumstances surrounding the filing of a registration
statement found to be materially misleading by the Second Circuit in
Kaiser-FrazerCorp. v. Otis & Co.1 "

In NationalStudent Marketing

170. See note 21 supra.
171. 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952). The misstatement in the registration statement that was isolated by the Second Circuit had
to do with the inflation of the issuer's earnings in financials accompanying the
registration statement. The earnings for December of 1947 (the most recent month
for which figures were available at the effective date) were stated to be 4 million
dollars. In truth, the figure was $900,000, with the difference being made up of
adjustments that should have been prorated over the entire year. The SEC's handling of the Kaiser-Frazer registration statement controversy is discussed in a report
prepared by a special Securities and Exchange Subcommittee created by the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. H.R. REP. No. 2508, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1952). Among other things, the report mentions testimony by SEC
chairman Donald C. Cook to the effect that the issuer, underwriters and the
accountants "knew the facts" relating to the misleading nature of the December
figures prior to the filing of the registration statement. Id. at 56.
In the summary of its discussion of the handling of the Kaiser-Frazer situation by the Commission, the investigating subcommittee stated that the Commission's handling of the affair
reveals a shocking story of errors, indifference, and evasion on the part
of the Commission and its staff. We are satisfied from the investigation we have made thus far of the case that from the very beginning the
Commission and its staff members were either "asleep at the switch" or
deliberately ignored the facts that were available to them. Id. at 91.
What may perhaps have contributed to the lethargy on the part of the SEC that
was scored in the report was the identity of one of the issuer's accountantsWilliam W. Werntz. Less than two years before the registration statement was
filed, Mr. Werntz had been on the Commission's payroll as its chief accountant.
If this factor caused the Commission to "go easy" on the principals in the
Kaiser-Frazercase, there is eveiy indication that the same treatment would not be
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the Commission is again embroiled in controversy-this time because
it has allegedly gone too far, rather than not far enough.
The Allegations
The SEC's complaint in the National Student Marketing action

alleges liability on the part of the defendant attorneys under the securities laws arising from claimed malfeasance in three different opinion letter settings: (1) rendering opinion letters as a condition precedent to the closing of a business transaction; (2) giving a legal
opinion stating in substance that certain securities may be sold; and
(3) rendering opinions as to the legal effect of a business transaction
for use by independent accountants in the certification of financial
statements disseminated to stockholders and the investing public.
For convenience, these different opinion letter situations will be respectively referred to as the "merger opinions," the "stock sale opinion" and the "Compujob opinions." An analysis of the various theories for relief asserted by the SEC follows individual consideration
of the SEC's allegations.
The merger opinions. The second count of the Commission's
complaint alleges in substance that defendants White & Case and
Lord, Bissell & Brook and certain of their lawyers violated the securities laws 172 by fraudulently issuing opinions in connection with
consummation of a merger between National Student Marketing Corporation (NSMC) and Interstate National Corporation (INC). The
Commission's allegations stem from representations made in a proposed merger agreement distributed to INC and NSMC shareholders
in connection with a proxy solicitation relative to the planned merger.
For present purposes, the significant representations in the proxy
materials were that (1) NSMC's earnings for the nine-month period ended May 31, 1969 were $700,000, and (2) consummation of
the merger was contingent upon (a) Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.'s
(PMM) issuance of a comfort letter stating, inter alia, that NSMC's
nine-month interim financial statements were not materially misleadforthcoming today. See SEC v. Vesco, 72 Civ. 5001 (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 27,
1972), in which antifraud charges are leveled at Alan F. Conwill, a New York City
lawyer, who served as General Counsel and later as Director of the SEC's Division of Corporate Regulation from 1961-64. It deserves mention that even the SEC's
action in Vesco has been the subject of criticism. See Wall Street J., May 14, 1973,
at 1, col. 1.
172. White & Case and one of its partners were charged with violating section
17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), and sections 10(b), 13(a)
and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id. §§ 78j(b), 78m(a), 78n(a),
and various rules promulgated thereunder, including rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1972). Lord, Bissell and two of its partners were charged under section 17(a) of
the 1933 Act, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5 thereunder.
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ing, and (b) the issuance of opinion letters by White & Case and
Lord, Bissell stating that all steps taken to consummate the merger
had been validly taken and that, to the knowledge of counsel, their
respective clients had complied with the law.
According to the SEC's allegations, in the course of reviewing
NSMC's financials PMM determined that the $700,000 figure reported in the proxy materials mailed to shareholders was not arrived at by application of generally accepted accounting principles.
Rather, as revealed by PMM's investigation, NSMC actually had
sustained a net loss for that period. These facts in turn caused the
comfort letter to fail to satisfy the role assigned it in the proxy materials. Notwithstanding this complication, and despite the dark
shadow that PMM's judgment cast over the validity of the proxy
solicitation materials in which the $700,000 earnings representation
appeared," 3 the defendant attorneys issued their opinion letters stating that all steps necessary to effectuate the merger had been taken
and that, to their knowledge, no violation of law had occurred.
These factual allegations, which are obviously serious enough
in themselves, do not disclose the complete contour of the merger
opinion case the SEC intends to make against defendant attorneys.
The allegation that has caused the lion's share of the notoriety already garnered by the Commission's action urges that the attorneys
be held liable not only for their issuance of misleading opinions but
also for their failure to take strenuous affirmative action to remedy
the effects of the allegedly improper proxy solicitation, including the
exertion of pressure on their clients:
As part of the fraudulent scheme White & Case, Epley, Lord
Bissell & Brook, Meyer and Schauer failed to refuse to issue their
opinions.

. .

and failed to insist that the financial statements be re-

173. Proxy rule 14a-9 provides in part:
No solicitation ...
shall be made by means of any proxy statement . . . containing any statement which, at the time and in light of
the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with
respect to any material fact ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1972).
The concept of shareholder rule through the device of proxy machinery is
fundamental to our corporate system. As was stated by a former SEC Commissioner,
[Ilegally, and in fact, the stockholders of a corporation are its owners.
As such they should have the ultimate voice in choosing their representatives in the corporate management and in determining crucial corporate issues such as mergers, consolidations, liquidations and so forth.
Whether or not the owners of the enterprise have an effective voice in running it depends on the means afforded to them for exercising the right
to vote. Address by Edward T. McCormick, East Side Forum on Public
Affairs, Feb. 13, 1951, reported in Hearings on Powers, Duties and
Functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 112 (1952).
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vised and shareholders be resolicited, and failing that, to cease representing their respective clients and, under the circumstances, notify
the plaintiff Commission concerning the misleading nature of the
174
nine-month financial statement.
The stock sale opinion. The SEC's second opinion letter
claim alleges the issuance of an opinion by defendant Lord, Bissell,
INC's counsel, after PMM's comfort letter disclosure of the inaccurate
nature of NSMC's interim financials. The opinion was issued at
the request of White & Case, NSMC's counsel, and stated in substance that certain NSMC shares acquired by certain INC shareholders pursuant to the merger could be sold. The opinion made no
mention of the need for adjustments in the interim financials, or of
the need for public disclosure of the comfort letter before the shares
could be lawfully sold, so that persons purchasing the stock could
be aware of the true state of NSMC's finances.
The Compujob opinions. The SEC's third opinion letter
claim charges in part that Robert A. Katz, a New York attorney, issued materially false and misleading legal opinions related to the
purchase by his clients of Compujob, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of NSMC. White & Case subsequently rendered an opinion
which concurred with the conclusion reached by Katz. 7 5 The SEC
alleges that the lawyers knew or should have known that NSMC intended to use the opinions to satisfy PMM that the sale of Compujob
and NSMC's gain therefrom could be accounted for in NSMC's financial statements for the fiscal year ended August 31, 1969. The
SEC termed the opinions "false and misleading" because they failed
to indicate that, among other things, negotiations for the sale of the
subsidiary had not even commenced as of the August date.
Analysis
The Compujob opinions--achieving parity between the professions. In a book appropriately entitled The Funny Money Game,
a former NSMC vice president comments on the decision to account
for the sale of Compujob in NSMC's August 31 financial statements:
When NSMC's 1969 fiscal year ended (August 31) it was clear that
the earnings projections, [NSMC's chief executive officer] had made
would be impossible to meet without a little "creative accounting."
174. Complaint, supra note 1, at 48i.
175. The Commission's last claim for relief also contains a separate opinion
letter charge against White & Case and one of its partners in connection with NSMC's
disposition of Collegiate Advertising, Ltd. The allegations involved in that charge
are substantially identical to the Compujob claims and are not discussed individually here.

422
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He needed to show about three and one-half million dollars in net
earnings. Two problems were Compujob, which you will recall lost
a lot of money despite the good publicity it produced for NSMC and
the Canadian arm of NSMC. So on November 30, 90 days after the
fiscal year had ended, an agreement was made to sell Compujob back
to Tan and Ed and the Canadian operation to its managers. According to the footnote, "in the opinion of counsel in both transactions negotiations and agreements of sale were in effect consummated prior
to August 31, 1969 . . . ." These transactions allowed NSMC to
add $369,000 in after-tax earnings, or about 10% to its 1969 results ....
How could something I saw everybody sweating over the night of
November 29 have, in effect, been consummated prior to August 31?
But I am not a lawyer or accountant, and our lawyers and accountants were evidently on record saying this was OK.170
This talk about "creative accounting" evokes the realization
that abusive accounting practices, like the departures from the straight
and narrow by corporate officers and directors that Chief Justice
Stone referred to, "do not usually occur without the active assistance"'" of some member of the legal profession. A case in point
is United States v. Simon. 78
The Simon case centered on actions taken by members of the
leading international accounting firm of Lybrand, Ross Bros. &
Montgomery in drawing up and certifying a false and misleading
balance sheet of Continental Vending Machine Corp. as of September 30, 1962. The principal charge against the accountants was
that they had failed to disclose that money supposedly being loaned
to a subsidiary, Valley Corp., was simply being funneled through
the subsidiary into the stock market for the private account of
Harold Roth, who was chief executive officer and the controlling
shareholder of Continental, and who also controlled the subsidiary.
The indictment against the accountants further charged that they
were remiss in failing to disclose in the balance sheet that the account receivable of Continental growing out of the loans to the subsidiary was inadequately secured. In fact, the loans were not adequately secured, and it is in connection with this development that a
176: A. TOBIAS, ThE FuNNY MONEY GAME 135-36 (1971). Needless to say,
the rosy picture which was painted of NSMC's operations in the news media during
this period gave the investing public little reason to suspect that "creative accounting" may have played a role in the company's success. E.g., Getting Across to the
Young, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 18, 1969, at 89.
177. Stone, supranote 9, at 9.
178. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
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lawyer assisted the Lybrand, Ross defendants in fashioning some
"creative accounting."

The attorney in question was Arthur Field, Continental's general counsel and a long-time friend of Roth. Field was a onequarter owner of the Continental subsidiary in question, and he had
served as a director of Continental until 1960 when his partner succeeded him. He had received Valley's financial statements and had
known since 1957 that Roth borrowed from the subsidiary. 179
When it became clear that the subsidiary could not pay the debt
it had incurred on Roth's behalf, Roth offered to post his equity in
certain securities and a mortgage on his home and furnishings to secure the debt owed by the subsidiary to Continental. Lybrand's
partner in charge decided that if adequate collateral were posted, a
satisfactory opinion from Field obtained, and approval of the transaction given by Continental's board, there would be adequate evidence of the receivable's collectibility. In a letter sent on February
18, Field gave Lybrand, Ross his opinion that the loan of some $3.5
million was "adequately secured."18 0 By February 25, the market
value of the security was only $395,000, and on that same day a
Continental check to the Internal Revenue Service was returned for
insufficient funds. A few days later, the government padlocked
the plant and the American Stock Exchange suspended trading in
Continental stock. Investigations by the SEC and bankruptcy rapidly ensued.
Comparison of the opinion letter circumstances involved in the
Simon case with the alleged facts surrounding issuance of the Compujob opinion letters by Katz and White & Case in the National
Student Marketing complaint shows little difference in the contexts
in which the opinion letters were rendered. The' main difference
between the situation in Simon and the Compujob charge in the
National Student Marketing complaint is, of course, that the "men of
blameless lives and respected members of a learned profession ' "'8
who had their professional careers ruined in the Simon case were all
accountants; 'Field never stood trial.'8 2 The sharp contrast between
this situation and the fate that may be awaiting the defendant attorneys in the National Student Marketing case is itself stark testimony
179. Note, The Criminal Liability of Public Accountants: A Study of United
States v. Simon, 46 NoTRE DAmF Lw. 564, 580-81 n.45 (1971).
180. 425 F.2d at 803.
181. Id. at 799.
182. Eleven co-conspirators were originally named, but at the conclusion of
the proceedings only Roth and the accountants remained implicated. Note, The
CriminalLiability of Public Accountants, supra note 179, at 570.
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to the momentous nature of the SEC's campaign to remind the bar
that lawyers "have a special responsibility in the securities area, just
as accountants and other professionals do."'18
The substantive basis for the potential liability of the defendant
attorneys for their Compujob opinions centers on the concept of
aider and abettor violations of the securities laws discussed earlier.1 8 4
The complaint faults the attorneys for rendering 'opinions which they
"knew or should have known that defendant NSMC intended to use
.. . to satisfy PMM that sale of Compujob could be accounted for
in defendant NSMC's fiscal year ended August 31, 1969."'' 15 Thus,
it is not the issuance of the opinions per se that the SEC charges was
illegal; rather, the SEC is attacking the issuance of the opinions with
the purpose of giving NSMC assistance in its efforts to persuade
PMM to include the effects of the Compujob transaction in the
year-end totals. This allegation, if sustained, is the essence of actionable aiding and abetting under the securities laws.
As noted previously, an aider and abettor violation 'of the securities laws has three elements: first, there must be an independent
wrong; second, the alleged aider and abettor must have "knowledge"
of the wrongful course of conduct; and third, he must give some
quantum of active assistance to the wrongdoing."8 In the context
of the unproven allegations in the complaint, the first prerequisite is
satisfied by the SEC's separate stock fraud charge against PMM
based on certification of the August 31 financials. The second prerequisite is met by the SEC's charges that defendant attorneys "knew
or should have known" that the opinions were materially false and
misleading. At the very least, the SEC's factual charges make out a
case for branding the attorney's conduct as reckless and, for aider
and abettor purposes, "knowledge can be shown by reckless conduct
or through inference."'1
The final prerequisite is satisfied by the
allegations that the attorneys "knew or should have known" that
183. N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 1972, at 1, col. 3 (remark of former SEC Commissioner Needham).
184. See notes 122-24 supra and accompanying text. Also set forth in the
SEC's first claim for relief are a potpourri of charges against PMM for fraudulent
accounting practices, including a charge that essentially parallels the SEC Compujob allegations against defendant attorneys. Compare Complaint, supra note 1, at
39(i) with id. at 1 54, 55. If correct, those charges would result in direct
liability for PMM under the securities laws for its fraudulent certification of
NSMC's 1969 Annual Report.
'185. Complaint, supra note 1, at 54.
186. See notes 122-24 supra and accompanying text.
187. Ruder, supra note 119, at 638.
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NSMC would use the opinions to give PMM an excuse to certify the
allegedly inflated year-end figures.
Strong support for the SEC's proposition that lawyers, acting as
lawyers, may be held liable under the aider and abettor theory is
1 8 8 a Second Circuit case decided
found in United States v. Sarantos,
on the same day the National Student Marketing complaint was filed.
The defendant attorney in Sarantos,who had prepared a visa petition
for an alien, was charged with thereby having aided and abetted an
attempt by the alien to secure residency in the United States through
a sham marriage. The attorney contended that he was entitled to
take every representation from his client at face value, and that to
hold otherwise would "make the attorney 'an investigative arm of
the government.' ,189 The court did not go so far as to hold that
the attorney had an obligation to go beyond his clients' representations, but it did hold that counsel could not escape liability "merely
by deliberately closing his eyes to the obvious risk that he is engaging
in unlawful conduct," and that "he cannot counsel others to make
statements in the face of obvious indications of which he is aware
that those assertions are not true."19 0
Significantly, the court in Sarantos buttressed its holding with
citation to its earlier ruling in United States v. Benjamin.19 The
defendant attorney in Benjamin was held criminally liable for having
knowingly rendered false opinion letters to facilitate the illegal sale
of unregistered stock. It was in Benjamin that the Second Circuit
placed lawyers' opinions and accountants' certificates on a par and
affirmed that liability awaits the reckless:
In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's
opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent
than the chisel or the crowbar. Of course, Congress did not mean
that any mistake of law or misstatement of fact should subject an attorney or an accountant to criminal liability simply because more
skillful practitioners would not have made them. But Congress
equally could not have intended that men holding themselves out as
members of these ancient professions should be able to escape criminal liability on a plea of ignorance when they have shut their eyes to
what was plainly to be seen or have represented a knowledge they
92
knew they did not possess.'
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 881.
Id.
328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
Id. at 863.
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The potential utility of Sarantos and Benjamin has not been overlooked by the Commission. 9 a
The stock sale opinion. The SEC's claim that Lord, Bissell

issued its stock sale opinion on White & Case's request "[i]n furtherance of a fraudulent scheme"' 94 likewise suggests aider-andabettor-style liability. The heart of the SEC's charge is, of course,
that the firm issued a groundless opinion letter that had the effect of
providing NSMC with an excuse for permitting the sale of its stock
transferred pursuant to the NSMC-INC merger-a merger allegedly
consummated with knowledge that the proxy solicitation had been
defective.
As evidence of the baseless nature of the stock sale opinion, the
SEC has alleged that Lord, Bissell neglected to consider both the true
state of NSMC's interim financials and the contents of PMM's comfort letter. Apparently, the SEC has in mind its 1962 release taking
the position that "[o]bviously, an attorney's opinion . . . is worthless . . . if unspecified but vital facts are not considered."' 19 Hav-

ing viewed the allegedly defective proxy solicitation as. a sufficient
basis for institution of this historic lawsuit against firms of the caliber
of White & Case, Lord, Bissell and PMM, it is not surprising that the
Commission likewise views the implications of the comfort letter as
something that should have been considered in connection with the
rendition of an opinion freeing roughly $3 million worth of stock for
sale to an uninformed public pursuant to the merger.
This is not to say either that the complicating effect of the comfort letter was not in fact taken into account by Lord, Bissell and
White & Case concerning the stock sale opinion or that the facts revealed in the comfort letter were material to the transaction and not
properly overridden by the "business decision" by INC's management to close the transaction notwithstanding the revelations con193. See Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Opposition to the Motions of Defendants Lord, Bissell and Cameron Brown to Dismiss
the Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be Granted or,
in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to the Motion of
Defendants Paul E. Allison, William J. Bach and Robert P. Tate for Summary
Judgment at 29-30, SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civ. Action No.
225-72 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972); Memorandum of Points and Authorities of
the Securities and Exchange Commission in Opposition to the Motions of Defendants White & Case and Marion J. Epley, III to Dismiss, or Alternatively, to Sever
and Transfer, at 9-10 & n.12, id. The contested motions have been denied as to
all movants except Allison, Bach and Tate. SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 93,820, at 93,552
(D.D.C. 1973).
194. Complaint, supra note 1, at 50.
195. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962).
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cerning the questionable accuracy of the interim financials. With
respect to the latter point, in the transaction in question INC appears
to have had the right to waive any of the conditions to the merger,
including PMM's rendition of a comfort letter in a form comporting
with the requirements of the merger agreement. 196 Further, INC's
president is reported to have testified to the Commission that his
concern at the closing was with NSMC's year-end earnings, and the
restated interim figures apparently did not alter the anticipated
197
year-end results.
These additional revelations show that, like the contingent liability hypothetical, 198 the SEC's National Student Marketing complaint involves the interpositioning of corporate counsel between the
public interest in corporate democracy promoted by shareholder
votes cast after full and fair disclosure, and the duty of counsel to assist in executing difficult business decisions necessarily made on the
spur of the moment in the face of changing circumstances. Compounding this conceptual dilemma is the prospect that counsel's
judgment may be challenged regardless of the position taken. A demand on management that proxies be resolicited may destroy delicate
timing and kill off a deal that might be in the long run best interests
of the shareholders. On the other hand, shareholders may well be
expected to second-guess management and its advisors if performance does not measure up to expectations.
Gauging where the balance is to be struck in any given case is
bound to be a difficult task for the business lawyer, but the need to
choose is inescapable. It is surely true that what is or is not "material" is a kaleidoscopic inquiry, with slight twists in factual settings
resulting in differences in outcome. Yet if the securities laws are to
mean anything, boundaries must inevitably be drawn somewhere.
In facing this important decision-making responsibility, a lawyer can
take heart in the truism that courts recognize he is not an insurer of
his opinions in the absence of an express agreement. Further,
judges called upon to evaluate his reaction to the exigencies of practice may be -expected to recall the Supreme Court's admonition in
United States v. American Bell Telephone Co.' 99 regarding the use
of hindsight in assessing conduct: "[A] wisdom born after the event
is the cheapest of all wisdom. 2 °0
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

National Student Marketing, 5 Rlv. SEc. REG. 913, 914 (1972).
Id. at 914 n.1.
See notes 167-69 supra and accompanying text.
167 U.S. 224 (1897).
Id. at 261.
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Aside from the profound implications concerning the lawyer's
multiple responsibilities inherent in the SEC's stock sale opinion
claim, another aspect of the Commission's claim is of interest here.
As noted, in the accounting profession the use of other auditors'
opinions is permissible only if, at a minimum, the other auditors'
professional reputation and independence have been established.201
Further, reliance on audits performed by outside auditors is permitted only where the reliant accountant can be satisfied with the audit's
accuracy.
In charging securities laws violations by both the law firm that
requested the stock sale opinion and the law firm that rendered it,
the SEC apparently feels that White & Case had sufficient notice of
the alleged fraudulent scheme to understand that sale of the stock
was improper regardless of the conclusion reached in Lord, Bissell's
opinion. Apart from questions as to the propriety of reliance in the
face of knowledge of the true situation, the wisdom of White &
Case's decision to seek the opinion from Lord, Bissell instead of
counsel less interested in the transaction is also open to question.
Along with White & Case, Lord, Bissell was deeply involved in all
aspects of the transaction giving rise to the stock sale which was the
subject of the opinion. Additionally, one of Lord, Bissell's partners
served as director of INC, and this same director-partner allegedly
prepared or directed the preparation of the stock sale opinion.
Further, the Lord, Bissel director-partner allegedly sold some of his
NSMC shares received pursuant to the merger at approximately the
same time that shares were reportedly sold after issuance of the stock
sale opinion.
This is not meant even to hint that Lord, Bissell's stock sale
opinion does not represent the result of carefully exercised independent legal judgment, for the defendants have not yet had their day
in court. However, one may wonder whether a law firm is wise to
render an opinion, or expect another firm to render an opinion, in
circumstances where the opining firm might have to rule "independently" on an important aspect of a transaction it has assisted in effectuating or where the opining lawyer wears a number of different
hats, including one as an insider. Because of complications like
these, some law firms have adopted the policy of restricting participation by their lawyers as investors in transactions in which the firm
renders professional services.202
201. See text accompanying note 127-28 supra.
202. One reason for this policy was spelled out by a practitioner as follows:
The fear really is, if you get sued in one of these cases in which
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On the aider and abettor issue, the SEC's case against the law
firms is obviously not harmed by the Century Investment Transfer

case, where the defendant attorney's opinions were looked on as crucial to the distribution of the unregistered securities and thus sufficient to find him an aider and abettor of the scheme in deciding the
motion for a preliminary injunction. 0 White & Case's demand for
an opinion on behalf of NSMC can arguably be viewed as making
Lord, Bissells opinion "crucial" to the transaction, and the SEC's
factual allegations relative to the merger clearly call into question
the propriety of the firm's alleged failure to confront the consequences
of PMM's comfort letter.
The merger opinion. The SEC's allegations regarding the liability of defendant attorneys for the merger opinions reveal a doublebarreled theory of recovery. First, the SEC asserts that the representations in the proxy solicitations that the opinions were to function as conditions made issuance of the opinions "crucial" to the
merger and thus made the law firms participants in the transaction.
Second, the SEC claims that "under the circumstances" the defendant attorneys had an obligation to notify the Commission as to the
allegedly misleading nature of the interim financials failing all other
efforts to rectify the adverse effects of the misleading proxy solicitation. These two facets of the SEC's merger opinions claim will be
considered in order.
(1)

Participation in the transaction. As with its stock sale

claims, the SEC's merger opinion charges seem to depend on the
view that since the lawyers allowed their opinions to become "crucial"
to the merger transaction as disclosed conditions precedent to consummation of the merger, the participation element of anifraud liability was satisfied. Under the SEC's theory, the participatory nexus
linking the attorneys' opinions to the merger is furnished by disclosure in the proxy material disseminated to shareholders." 4
you were counsel for the company, and it turns out that a couple of
your partners purchased substantial blocks of the stock, plaintiff may put
you on the witness stand and say, "Did you purchase any? Did your
partner?" " Yes. He purchased 10,000 shares." "Was your vision
colored because you hoped the offering would be successful?" Your
answer is no; but the question was asked and the jury hears it, and as
you all know from practicing, this may be all the difference in the world
to the outcome of the case. PROTECTI o THE CoRPoRATE OFFIcER, supra
note 19, at 89-90 (remarks of Herbert S. Wander).
See also note 231 infra.
203. SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. Snc. L. REP. g 93,232, at 91,438 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
204. One commentator has astutely synthesized the SEC's theory in one sentence:
When an attorney permits his name to be used either in a registration
statement or in any other document associated with a securities transac-
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The notion that attorneys will be attacked by the SEC in injunction actions if they appear to misperform obligations which they
said in documents filed with the Commission they would undertake

is not startling. The need for the Commission to be able to put its
faith in the forthrightness and diligence of the securities bar is readily
apparent, and it is recognized among the securities bar that the Commission does in fact depend on counsel.2 0 5 However, in this situation whether the same sort of participation in wrongdoing by the at-

torneys can be said to exist with respect to private litigants is open
to some doubt.

On the one hand, there is some question whether

investors actually rely on participation by law firms named in SEC
documents, and the need for some sort of reliance is suggested by the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Wessel v. Buhler.20 6 On the other hand,

there is an adage that one is known by the company he keeps, and
this proposition has not been lost on proprietors of unseasoned companies who endeavor to improve their companies' standing in the
business community by surrounding themselves with well known
and highly respected legal and accounting firms. Indeed, it has
been commented that NSMC's management seems to have followed
this approach to image enhancement. 0 7 In cases where a reputable

law firm has allowed itself to be held out to the investing public as
providing counsel to an unseasoned company, there may perhaps
exist an inference of reliance by the investing public on the firm

that would not arise where the client's management had earned a
tion, and such attorney's opinion or other participation will have the effect
of inducing third parties to rely upon that attorney's participation as to the
validity of a transaction or the occurrence of an event, the attorney's responsibilities cease to be solely to his client and run to these third parties, of
which the SEC may be one, if the attorney's representations are contained in a document filed with such agency. Goldberg, Attorney's
Responsibilities to Third Parties: The National Student Marketing Case,
N.Y.LJ., March 10, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
205. Cf. Panel Discussion, supra note 20, at 960 (remarks of Robert H. Mundhelin); PLI, FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECUIuTIES REGULATION 78 (1972)
("Noblesse oblige- the greater the reputation of the firm the more the Commission
is likely to depend on it . . . and thus the greater the potential responsibility and
exposure.").
206. See notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text.
207. Speaking from hindsight, a former NSMC vice president has said that
when he weighed his decision to join NSMC he felt that the company's story
"was all a little unreal" but that this was not decisive because
some awfully distinguished firms seemed to attest to NSMC's good character: Lawyers were White & Case; auditors had been Arthur Andersen
and were then (without even knowing the rest of the sentence, a Harvard
Business School graduate would see red flags going up all over, but at
the time I never thought to wonder why a company switched auditors)
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company (more red flags, but I had never
heard of Yale Express, and then who then knew what was going on at
Penn Central?). A. ToBIAs, supranote 176, at 39.
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good reputation in the investment community through its own efforts.
(2) The duty to dissociate and disclose. The Commission's
stance relative to defendant attorneys' merger opinions is that having
become participants in the transaction by disclosure that their opinions were ingredients in the merger matrix, the defendant attorneys,
upon divulgence of the misleading nature of the interim financial,
had an obligation to demand the proxies be resolicited so the shareholders could rethink their votes on the merger in light of NSMC's
true financial condition, or dissociate themselves from the transaction and, as a last resort, report the matter to the Commission. On
the facts alleged (which, it bears reiteration, have not yet stood the
test of adversary proceedings), the Commission's position seems to
find support in case law and in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As noted, in Fischer v. Kletz208 the plaintiff stated a good
cause of action under common law and securities law theories where
the defendant accountants were charged with failing to divulge
promptly their discovery that financials they had earlier certified in
good faith were in fact false and misleading. The subsequent embodiment by the accounting profession of the lesson of the Fischer
case in a Statement of Auditing Procedure2°9 has also been pointed
out. Additionally, an Interpretive Opinion to the accounting profession's Code of Professional Ethics demands that an accountant
"should refuse to permit his name to be associated

. . .

in any way

with financial statements known by him to be false or misleading as
a whole or in any significant respect ... .
A similar obligation to insure that professional conduct and
reputation is untainted by association with wrongdoing is recognized
by the legal profession. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) of the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable
to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
tribunal.
208. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
209. STATEMENT ON AuTING PROCEDURE No. 41, supra note 145.
210. AmE exI INsTrruTE OF CERTIFID PUmLIC AccouNTs, CODE OF PRoPESSiONAL ETmcs 16-17 (1971) (Interpretive Opinion No. 8).
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(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a
tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal. 21 '

The philosophy embodied in the Disciplinary Rule is supported
by Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C), which makes it clear that the duty
of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences does not prevent an
attorney from revealing "[c]onfidences or secrets when permitted
under Disciplinary Rules . . . [or] [t]he intention of his client to
commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime. 21 2 Moreover, with respect to future illegalities, a footnote
to Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)211 points to a 1965 American Bar
Association opinion 214 for the view that "a lawyer must disclose
. . . the confidences of his clients if 'the facts in the attorney's pos-

session indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed.'

"215

When pondering the import of these Disciplinary

Rules, two positions taken in the Code's Preliminary Statement
should be borne in mind: first, the Disciplinary Rules "are mandatory in character;" and second, they state the "minimum level of
conduct" demanded of an attorney in a given factual situation. 210
It may further be noted that the ethical guidelines regarding
disclosure of clear illegality are of relatively recent origin. The view
that disclosure of prospective illegality is demanded does not seem to
have been recognized prior to 1965, and Disciplinary Rule 7-102
(B) appears to make a clean break with the past view of an attorney's obligation to disclose his client's fraud. In 1953 the American
Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics ruled, by a fivetwo vote, that an attorney who obtains a divorce for his client has
no obligation to reveal his client's perjury regarding a vital element
of the case.21" The majority felt that the lawyer's professional obligations were satisfied when he refused to furnish further assistance
to the client. The position of the 1953 opinion was expressly re211. CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmmITY,

supra note 16, Disciplinary Rule

7-102(B).
212. Id., Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C).
213. Id. at 18 n.16.
214. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETcs, OPINION No. 314 (1965).

opinion provides in part that
the absolute duty not to make false assertions of fact [does not] require the disclosure of weakness in the client's case and in no event does
it require disclosure of his confidences, unless the facts in the attorney's
possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed. Id.
215. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 16, at 18 n.16.
216. Id. at 2.
217. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETnCS, OPINION 287 (1953).

The
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jected by the draftsmen of 7-102(B).218
The BarChris decision holds that professionals should not be
held to a standard of conduct higher than that existing in the profession.21 9 By its merger opinion claims the SEC appears to have used
the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility and the Fischer case to fash-

ion its yardstick for measuring the legitimacy of the defendant attorneys' conduct under the securities laws. It is not easy to fault the
Commission for that, absent some reliance on the argument that
an attorney's responsibilities run solely to his client. And as has already been pointed out, the infirmities of that argument are that it
fails to account for the essential similarity of audit certificates and legal opinions, it ignores the realities of stock market life, and it fails
to recognize that the times have changed. It is probably fair to
say that few lawyers appreciated the increased emphasis on public
accountability manifested in the 1965 Opinion and Disciplinary
Rule 7-102(B).

The lesson of the National Student Marketing

complaint is, as "Adam Smith" has warned us, "W]e ignore revolutions at our peril." And as a profession it behooves us to bear in
mind that "in every revolution the lawyers lead the way to the guil'220
lotine or the firing squad.
OPINION LETTER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Set forth in this section of the article is an outline of policies
and procedures relative to the preparation of opinion letters. Like
any collection of general guidelines, such as the accounting profession's Statements on Auditing Procedure which this outline is in part

patterned after, the guidelines set forth below are interstitial in nature and will need to be modified to fit specific cases. Members of
smaller firms may find some humor in the high degree of decentralization envisioned by the procedures, but it should be realized that
regimentation is only a tool that may be used to insure that the legal
opinion rendered is the product of thorough study and the exercise
of independent judgment. While the utility of following some set of
guidelines in preparing opinion letters is readily evident in view of
the National Student Marketing confrontation, it is equally clear that
218. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) cites the 1953 Opinion as suggesting a strongly
contrary position.
219. 283 F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But see United States v. Simon,
425 F.2d 796, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970) (holding
that evidence of accountants' compliance with generally accepted accounting principles "may be highly persuasive, but not conclusive" as to appropriateness of an
auditor's conduct).
220. F. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, Lw.wYEs! 17 (1957).
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a check list in itself never insulated anybody from liability. For real
protection from a securities fraud or malpractice claim there is no
substitute for a professional attitude, professional ability, and profes22 1
sional know-how.
OPINION LETTER GUIDELINES
I. OPINION LETTERS AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS COVERED:
A.
B.

Opinion letters issued pursuant to agreements;
Opinion letters required by law or stock exchange regulation to be rendered in connection with the issuance or
transfer of securities;
C. Opinion letters to be used in connection with seriously contested matters, including litigation;
D. Audit letters;
E. Any other communications which may reasonably be construed to express the opinion of the firm on points of law or
judgment, and which may reasonably be relied on by third
parties.
F. Any doubts as to whether a communication may be interpreted as expressing the opinion of the firm within the
meaning of these guidelines are to be resolved by either

221. This point was driven home most felicitously in a memorandum Louis
Brandeis is reported to have written to himself on the subject of "what the practice of law includes." The memorandum reads in part:
Know thoroughly each fact ....
Don't believe client witness. Examine documents. Reason; use imagination. Know bookkeeping-the universal language of business; know persons .

.

.

Know not only spe-

cific facts, but whole subject. Can't otherwise know the facts. Know
not only those facts which bear on direct controversy but know all the facts
and law that surround. Memorandum by Louis Brandeis, reprinted in
THE GRowTH OF AmucAN L.AW, supranote 147, at 339.
Similar good counsel applicable to securities lawyers was given by one of the
participants in the American Bar Association's National Institute on the BarChrls
case:
No lawyer can be a decent lawyer in the securities field unless he
can read and tear apart an income statement and a balance sheet; unless
he understands the company and the industry in which he is participating in preparing the registration statement. I think that requires a
visit to at least some of the company's offices and plants. I think it involves an understanding of the manufacturing process and the accounting
system. I think it requires a lawyer who had the financial sophistication
to handle his own investments. . . . It is important that [lawyers] know
what an investment is and how the securities market works. There are
too many lawyers who can read a book or analyze a case or establish
nice legal distinctions but who haven't the foggiest idea about what an
investor ought reasonably to know about a prospective investment. BarChris Institute, supra note 67, at 623-24 (remarks of Graham L. Sterling,
Jr.).
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treating the communication as an opinion in accordance
with these guidelines or making clear in the text of the

communication that it is not to be construed as an opinion
of the firm on the matter considered.
II. FACTUAL BASIS FOR ALL OPINIONS:

A. The circumstances to be dealt with in any proposed opinion
must be thoroughly examined, with the results of the examination documented in the file, before the opinion can
be issued.

B.

The following standards2 ' should be adhered to by persons conducting examinations preparatory to the issuance
of an opinion:
1. The examination is to be performed by a lawyer having

sufficient technical training to perform all phases of
the task;

2. The lawyer making the examination is to maintain an
independence in mental attitude in all matters relating
to the management of the investigation;
222. Investigative standards 1-5 are adapted from CoMMITrEE
PRocEmnrE OF THE AMEICAN

ON AuDrrrNG

INSTrrUTE OF CERTFmED PuBLic ACCOuNTANTS,

STATEMENT ON AUDING PROCEDURE No. 33, AuDrNG STANDARDS
CEDURE 15-16 (1963).
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.

AND

PRO-

Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), gives ample justification for the sixth requirement. In that case
Judge McLean criticized the defendant attorney who had prepared the registration
statement for not checking with his firm's bookkeeper to see if the bill for legal
fees marked paid by BarChris had in fact been paid. The court said that
"[i]f he [the attorney] had inquired and had found that this representation was untrue,
this discovery might well have led him to a realization of the true state of BarChris' finances in May 1961." Id. at 692.
The legitimacy of a common sense approach in gauging the adequacy of investigation was emphasized by Milton V. Freeman when he discussed opinions
dealing with pending litigation:
As to his prediction as to the outcome of specific litigation, if we
could find somebody who would be regarded as an expert, he would have a
fabulous career. Assuming that the lawyer has taken the trouble to pay
some attenfion to what the complaint states and what the allegations are,
and has made some research into the law, his conclusion will not subject
him to liability even if it should turn out to be in error. BarChris Institute, supra note 67, at 676 (remarks of Milton V. Freeman).
See also Sommer & Grienenberger, Summary of the Meeting Between Members of
the Securities and Exchange Commission and Representatives of the Federal Regulation of the Securities Committee of the Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law of the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.-lanuary 13,
1972, 27 Bus. LAw. 949, 950 (1972) (reporting a comment by then SEC Chairman Casey to the effect that a lawyer familiar with the history of the company
and management could rely to a great extent on management's representations,
but that there were many cases where facts needed to be independently verified).
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3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the perform-

ance of the examination and the preparation of memoranda pertaining thereto;
4. The examination is to be supervised by the partner in
charge;

5. By reason of the examination, sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection,
observation, inquiries, confirmations and research to

afford a reasonable basis for the opinion;
6. Before completing the examination, contact should be
made with lawyers who may have special knowledge
about the facts being examined, including the partner
in charge of billing for the matter in question.
2 3
I1. ADEQUACY OF DISCLOSURE:

A.

While it is recognized that the contents of opinion letters
will vary under the circumstances, the opinion must at a
minimum apprise the reader of:

224
1. The scope of the matters covered in the opinion;
2. All material facts relied upon as verified by examin225
ation;
223. See generally STATEMENT ON AUDrrINO PROCEDURE No. 33, supra note

222, at 54-55 (dealing with adequacy of informative disclosure).
224. With respect to opinions by counsel for underwriters, it has been noted
that:
The form of the opinion relating to the registration statement is, in
my judgment, of great importance from the standpoint of determining
what responsibility counsel for the underwriters has assumed. This was
the subject of comment by Judge McLean in BarChris in which he stated
that the words of the opinion did not conform with the testimony given
by the representative of the underwriters as to what they were relying
upon counsel to do. BarChris Institute, supra note 67, at 654 (remarks of David S. Henkel).
225. The need for full disclosure of all relevant considerations pertaining to the
subject matter of the opinion is strongly suggested by SEC Securities Act Release
No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962). This is not to say that an opinion letter must reveal
every conceivable tidbit of information bearing on the facts and investigation of
them. The folly in trying for an all-inclusive approach was pointed out in connection with the use of legal opinions by underwriters to sustain their due diligence
defense in a BarChristype situation:
MR. APPLEBAUM: We were asked for such an opinion by a midwestern based house that we did some work for. The opinion we ended up
giving-I do not know whether you would call it an opinion or notlisted everything that the underwriter's own people had done by way of
investigation and then everything that counsel had done; and then said
that we could not think of anything else to be done, and that they had
informed us that they could not think of anything else to be done, and
that if there was not anything else to be done, then they had done everything that could be done. The next time we did an issue for that house,
they did not request it!
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3. Any material facts relied upon which were not veil-

fied by examination and any qualifications of the opin220
ion occasioned thereby;

4. Any circumstances bearing on the independence of the
firm and its lawyers regarding the matter in question,

including directorships and stock ownership positions
22 7

held in a party involved in the matter;
5. The significant conclusions reached; and

6. For whose use the opinion is intended. 2 8

B.

22 9
Use of opinions prepared by other counsel:

1. In the preparation of legal opinions reliance may be
placed on opinions issued by other counsel only after
satisfactory proof as to the professional reputation and
independence of judgment of the other attorney. No
reliance may be placed on another attorney's opinion
when there exists substantial reason to doubt the conclusions stated therein.

2. If it is desired not to assume responsibility for the matters which are the subject of the other counsel's opinion, the opinion letter should make reference to the

other opinion letter and should indicate clearly the
division of responsibility for matters covered by the
opinions.
C. Nothing contained herein prevents the disclaimer or qual230
ification of an opinion.
MR. MCDOWELL: At any rate it -seems to me that this kind of
material in an opinion does not really help the due diligence defense very
much. Officers' and Directors' Institute, supra note 18, at 136 (remarks
of Alan Applebaum and Robert A. McDowell).
226. Cf. text accompanying notes 128-29 supra; STATEMENT ON AunrriNG PROCEDuRE No. 33, supra note 222, at 63-69 (discussing the effects of circumstances
that make it impracticable or impossible to verify matters by independent examination).
227. Cf. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5094 (Oct. 21, 1970) ("Guide Relating to the Interest of Counsel and Experts in the Registrant").
228. For example, some firms serving as counsel in public offerings have
adopted the policy of rendering two separate opinions to the underwriters. One
covers such things as the incorporation of the issuer and the validity of the securities. It is intended for the benefit of the underwriters and purchasers of the
securities. The second opinion deals with the registration statement and it is intended solely for the use of the underwriter. See Officers' and Directors' responsibilities, supra note 18, at 135-36 (remarks of Robert A. McDowell); BarChris
Institute, supra note 67, at 654 (remarks" of David S. Henkel).
229. See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text.
230. See generally STATEMENT ON AuDrrrNG PROCEDURE No. 33, supra note
222, at 63 (discussing circumstances causing an auditor to qualify or disclaim an

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1973:371

IV. REVIEW
A.

All opinion letters subject to these procedures should be

reviewed by a partner able to make an evaluation of the
soundness of the conclusions reached and their consistency

B.

with similar positions taken by the firm in comparable
situations.
It is the responsibility of the partner in charge to insure
that the name of the reviewing partner and the scope of
the review are noted in the file.

V. SIGNATURE:

Only partners are authorized to sign the firm name to opinion
letters covered by these provisions. The only exception to this
restriction is that, after an opinion has been examined by the
reviewing partner and prepared in final form, the partner in
charge may specifically authorize an associate to sign the

firm's name to the document.
VI. PARTICIPATION IN TRANSACTION:
Lawyers may not participate as investors
in any transaction for
2 -31
letter.
opinion
an
issues
firm
the
which
VII. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS:

If, subsequent to the date of issuance of any opinion letter, it
becomes apparent that circumstances may have existed at that
date which might have had a significant effect on the opinion
had such facts been known, then it should be considered whether
there are persons currently relying on -or likely to rely on the
opinion). The SEC apparently recognizes that "it is quite appropriate in some
circumstances to state that counsel expresses no opinion on the merits or probable
outcome of . . . litigation." Sommer & Grienenberger, supra note 222, at 950.
The threat of either tipping a client's hand as to the existence of a contingent liability or being less than candid with an inquiring accountant has led some firms to
adopt the practice of refusing to render opinions as to clients' contingent liabilities.
Address of Francis M. Wheat, supra note 85.
231. See note 202 supra and accompanying text. There is some question
whether lawyers should own stock in a client at all. The logic behind a rule
banning stock ownership was discussed by members of a panel of securities lawyers at the 1972 New York Law Journal Conference on lawyers' expanding responsibilities:
MR. FLOM: [B]asically our firm is against owning stock in clients.
In no small measure because whatever you do, you have to be wrong.
If you own stock and the client is relatively small, if you sell and
the stock goes up, you feel stupid. And if you sell and the stock goes
down, everybody accuses you of trading on inside information.
MR. SOMMER: If you sell at all under any circumstances your client will think you lost faith in him and be aggrieved over that. I think
that's a very tough problem. TPANSCRIPT, supra note 14, at 174.
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opinion who would attach importance to the subsequently discovered information. If, after weighing various pertinent
factors, including the time elapsed since the opinion was given,
it becomes apparent that action should be taken to prevent
future reliance on the opinion, appropriate steps should be
taken to make disclosure of the newly discovered facts and
their opinion to persons who are known to be currently relying
on, or who are likely to rely on the opinion. The method of
notification should be the best practicable under the circumstances, and
may include notification of pertinent regulatory
2 2
agencies.
CONCLUSION

There is an admonition in the Book of Luke that reads: "Alas
for you lawyers . . . because you load on men burdens that are un-

endurable, burdens that you yourselves do not move a finger to
'
lift."238
The SEC's charges against the defendant attorneys in the
National Student Marketing case undermine the validity of that

comment. To be sure, the SEC's theme portends a future filled
with hard choices for business lawyers, but is not the pressure of
choice inherent in the legal calling? What is the lawyer's stock in
trade if it is not the exercise of studied judgment?
Whatever the ultimate outcome of the National Student Marketing litigation, the case will very likely be seen in retrospect as having
had at least one salutary effect. Spurred by the Commission's unprecedented charges, the corporate bar has already begun to engage
in a self-analysis that promises to yield an articulation of more visible
and cogent standards to govern professional conduct. This development will surely redound to the mutual benefit of the bar and the
people it serves, and it is by evoking from the bar a firm commitment to the principle of professional self-regulation that the National
Student Marketing case promises to enrich the practice of corporate
law.
232. See notes 143-46 supra and accompanying text.
233. Luke 11:46 (Jerusalem Bible). As the general counsel for a major accounting firm has noted:
Recent complaints filed against lawyers have generated cries of anguish
about damaged reputation. In the past, when other professional groups
pointed out that the mere filing of a complaint without more can be
very damaging to reputation, their lamentations fell largely on deaf ears.
Now that lawyers are also targets-indeed, ripe targets according to the
apparent consensus of this panel-perhaps they will reevaluate their function in drafting complaints against other lawyers and other professionals.
I am not suggesting that they should desist from bringing such actions; I am suggesting that they should look once again at the letter and
spirit of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which has for
too long been honored in the breach. TRANscRPT, supra note 14, at 250
(remarks of Victor M. Earle, Ell).

